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SUPER DEFERENCE, THE SCIENCE
OBSESSION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW AS
TRANSLATION OF AGENCY SCIENCE
Emily Hammond Meazell*
When courts review agencies' scientific and technical determinations,
they often emphasize that the specialized subject matter requires
them to be at their most deferential. This "super-deference" principle
seems appealing because it is supported by basic notions of institu-
tional competence and accommodates a natural judicial tendency to
avoid deep encounters with science. But it stands in stark tension
with the expectation that courts must reinforce administrative-law
values like participation, transparency, and deliberation. And it fails
to further the legitimizing function of incorporating the best possible
science into institutional decision making. Surprisingly, there is no
scholarship comprehensively assessing super deference. This Article
begins to fill that gap by evaluating super deference contextually, tak-
ing into consideration the norms of both science and administrative
law. This analysis reveals that not only does super deference lack me-
rit, it also lacks a clear meaning and a framework for principled
application. Further it has fallen into disuse, giving way to tradi-
tional hard-look review. Building on these observations, this Article
develops a normative account of the courts' role with respect to
agency science. When courts engage in such review, they can use
their generalist perspectives to their advantage by serving an impor-
tant translating function for generalist consumers such as Congress
and the public at large-an approach that reinforces both scientific
and administrative-law values.
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INTRODUCTION
In the quest for better alignment of science and administrative law, the
role of the judiciary eludes easy assessment. The premise that expert agen-
cies are better situated than generalist judges to make policy decisions in
light of scientific uncertainty is an obvious enough starting place. Indeed,
this view is encapsulated in the principle that courts ought to be at their
"most deferential" when reviewing an agency's scientific determinations.'
This approach, which I refer to as "super deference," is appealing: it is
supported by basic notions of institutional competence and plays into a nat-
ural judicial tendency to avoid any deep confrontations with science. If we
are to believe observers of judicial science-not to mention the courts them-
selves-super deference has the salutary impact of shifting power over
science from inept generalists to superior experts. 2 Broader administrative-
law values support this view: if agency science is mostly about policy, and
1. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); see
also Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (suggesting deference
for determinations at "frontiers of scientific knowledge").
2. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487,
1507 (1983) ("[Tlechnocrats do understand and judges clearly cannot understand.").
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the politically accountable executive controls agencies, then agencies are the
more legitimate institution with respect to science.'
A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced picture. As noted by
scholars in other contexts, extraordinary deference as a general matter
stands in tension with the expectation that courts must reinforce administra-
tive-law values like participation, transparency, and deliberation.4 Not only
do these values reflect the constitutional design, but they are buttressed by
Congress's intent as expressed in the )udicial-review provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA"). And unlike the direct relationship
between courts and legislatures when statutes are under review and defer-
ence is sometimes justified, judicial review of agencies implicates all three
branches because courts not only check executive power, but must also be
mindful of legislative preferences.'
Further, administrative agencies cannot make an exclusive claim on sci-
ence because science plays a legitimizing role throughout government.
Suppose an administrative agency were to make a fundamental scientific
error that becomes the basis of a regulation. A judicial rule requiring ex-
treme deference-even to blatant scientific errors-would magnify those
errors and produce unfair results." If we want judicial review to enhance the
legitimacy of agency action, we ought to think critically about whether su-
per deference contributes to that end. If fairness and rationality are both
furthered when agencies capture the best that science can offer, perhaps a
more searching role for the courts-one that encourages agencies' princi-
pled use of science-is called for.
Adding to the intricacies, agency science is a peculiar product, quite re-
moved from the traditional image of pure research science. It is laced with
3. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)
(noting agencies make interpretations "in the context of implementing policy decisions in a techni-
cal and complex arena").
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits ofAggressive Judicial Review ofAgency
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 529 ("[A] world without aggressive judicial review might well suffer
from increases in lawlessness, carelessness, overzealous regulatory controls, and inadequate regula-
tory protection.").
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2006). The APA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06; for
more on the scope and intent of the APA, see infra Section I.A. (describing judicial review under the
APA).
6. For a critical analysis of extreme judicial deference to legislative science, see Emily
Hammond Meazell, Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial Review of Legislative
Science, 84 IND. L.J. 239 (2009).
7. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures as Politics]. Professor Bressman
presents a model of administrative law in which the Supreme Court is positioned as a mediator
between executive and legislative branches. As she states, "[T]he Court may enforce administrative
procedures in order to help ensure that agency decisions track dominant legislative preferences." Id.
at 1751.
8. See Carl F. Cranor, The Dual Legacy of Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical: Trading
Junk Science for Insidious Science, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 120, 122 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006) [here-
inafter RESCUING SCIENCE] (arguing that legal endorsement of mistaken science threatens the
legitimacy of law as an institution).
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policy decisions at numerous levels, making it susceptible to misuse.' For
example, interested parties and agencies alike are incentivized to cloak their
policy choices in the seemingly unassailable mantle of science. The occur-
rence of this phenomenon in agency decision making is well documented.
But neither the other branches nor the public is immune from this tendency
to mistake policy for science. Calls for "good" or "improved" science in
agencies are often motivated by the desire to change policy outcomes rather
than agencies' use of flawed science in reaching them.'o
Despite the scholarly literature's attention to the features of agency sci-
ence specifically and the role of judicial review in administrative law
generally, there has been no detailed examination of super deference as a
principle in its own right. The courts persist in emphasizing it as a reason to
avoid becoming too entangled in science, yet the few scholarly references
are not focused on furthering our understanding of super deference. Two
commentators lodged early criticisms in the wake of the modem super-
deference case, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.," but, of course, they could not evaluate how the principle was
to be applied in years to come.12 Otherwise, super deference is sometimes
mentioned with criticism, sometimes simply recited as a principle of judi-
cial review,14 and sometimes noted for the role it plays in judicial vacillation
9. Scholars have long recognized this potential. Some especially noteworthy works are
RESCUING SCIENCE, supra note 8; Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Man-
agement in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) [hereinafter Wagner, Science
Charade]. Furthermore, even pure research science incorporates policy decisions; as discussed in
Section I.B., the juxtaposition of science and the administrative process thus results in a pancaking
of policy decisions.
10. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERs 20
(1990) ("Although these controversies seemed on their face to be about science, the alignment of
parties on either side generally conformed to basic political and ideological cleavages between pro-
and antiregulation interests in American society."); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deos-
sifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity,
Deossifying] ("[Commentators] pick apart the agencies' preambles and background documents and
launch blunderbuss attacks on every detail of the legal and technical bases for the agencies' rules.");
Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1657 ("[A]dvocates ... become single-mindedly en-
gaged in presenting opposing scientific justifications, demanding outside scientific review, or
attacking the competence of the agency's science when it leads to results that run counter to their
own unexpressed policy preferences."). See generally Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shift-
ing Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2004)
("Science has considerable rhetorical appeal when it comes to defending regulatory decisions, as it
is often described and perceived as being 'objective.' ").
11. 462 U.S. 87 (1983). For a detailed discussion of Baltimore Gas, see infra Section II.B.
12. See Andrew D. Siegel, The Aftermath of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC: A
Broader Notion of Judicial Deference to Agency Expertise, 11 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 331, 378-80
(1987) (criticizing the broad deference to agencies in Baltimore Gas); Joel Yellin, Science, Technol-
ogy, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92
YALE L.J. 1300, 1320-24 (1983) (arguing that deference neither contributes to balance between
institutions nor encourages reasoned decision making).
13. See, e.g., Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1661-67 (arguing super deference
contributes to science charade).
14. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86
TEx. L. REV. 1601, 1631 (2008) (citing super-deference principle); Theodore C. Hirt, Current Issues
736 [Vol. 109:733
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between "hard" and "soft" review' 5-but all in other contexts, with other
focuses.
This gap in the literature is surprising because the stakes are high. Super
deference is not grounded in realistic notions of agency science; it may
contribute to ossification" and the science charade;" and it appears to have a
disparate impact on environmental law." Measured against broader adminis-
trative-law values, super deference also inhibits transparency; 20 undermines
deliberation;" fails to accord with political accountability;22 and generally
abdicates the courts' role in the constitutional scheme by encouraging
Involving the Defense of Congressional and Administrative Agency Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1377, 1397 (2000) ("In determining whether the agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious, the
court is not to weigh the scientific evidence or inquire into the wisdom of regulations based on that
evidence."); Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker, Scientific Uncertainty Under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1158 (2002) (reciting super deference as part of the
arbitrary and capricious standard).
15. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 411 (noting vacillation); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incen-
tives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051,
1064-66 (1995) [hereinafter Shapiro & Levy, Judicial Incentives] (describing the "proliferation of
manipulable categories to which different degrees of deference apply"); Donald W. Stever, Jr., Def-
erence to Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health, and Safety Litigation-
Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 35, 45 (1983) (de-
scribing the spectrum of "hard look," "quick look," and "no look" cases).
16. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs., Autumn 2003, at 45, 47 ("[S]cience is conspicuously absent from internal EPA delibera-
tions."); Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L.J. 1341,
1365-66 (1987) ("Regulatory agencies are regularly accused of being 'captured' by industry, con-
sumer groups, members of Congress, or bureaucratic inertia. They are never accused, however, of
being captured by scientists.").
17. But see Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Re-
sponse to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEx. L. REv. 525, 528 (1997) [hereinafter Ossification]
("[C]ontinuing scrutiny of reviewing courts under the hard-look doctrine caused the rulemaking
process to 'ossify' to a disturbing degree.").
18. See Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1661-67 (contending that the desire to
minimize judicial review incentivizes agencies to deliberately emphasize the scientific aspects of
what are ultimately value choices).
19. See Jim Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of
Origins with Human Destiny, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 299-300 (2005) (noting that "[m]ore
than most other areas of legal endeavor," environmental law involves scientific determinations with-
in agency's expertise); Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of
Information Policy, 89 IoWA L. REV. 495, 517 (2004) (calling "hard look" under NEPA "toothless,"
and citing Baltimore Gas); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered
Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 429-30 (2004) (suggesting that
deference may undermine the Endangered Species Act's best available science mandate). Indeed, a
February 2010 Westlaw search of 185 cases citing Baltimore Gas for the super-deference principle
revealed that over 75 percent of those cases involved environmental law.
20. See Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1662-66.
21. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (presenting empirical evidence suggesting that
changes in law increasing judicial deference result in more agency decisions being rationalized on
the basis that has promised judicial deference). But see Elliott, supra note 16, at 51 (arguing judicial
review is too "episodic, confused, and inconsistent to have much of a systematic effect on reforming
agency practices").
22. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 637 (1993).
Michigan Law Review
outcome-oriented review.2 For these and many other reasons, I contend that
super deference has very little utility.
Given this conclusion, one might ask what should replace super defer-
ence: how should courts review agency science? A detailed review of how
the courts apply super deference reveals a trend away from super deference
toward hard-look review, albeit couched in super-deference terminology.
This closer look reveals that traditional hard-look review can sufficiently
protect administrative-law values while reflecting our instinctive notions
about comparative institutional competence with respect to science. In mak-
ing this claim, I am aware of a longstanding debate about the efficacy of
hard look generally.24 My aim, however, is not so much to enter that debate
as to provide an account of the courts' role in reviewing agency science.
Indeed, I contend that the courts' comparative disadvantages with re-
spect to science can actually enhance their role in the constitutional
framework. Drawing on insights from political theory, social science, and
the broader administrative-law discourse, I argue that thoroughly written
judicial opinions serve an important function for science in our legal institu-
tions. These opinions, written by generalists, necessarily reflect a generalist
understanding of the science and policy issues present in agency decision
making. That is as it should be, because they in turn provide important
translations for generalist consumers-Congress, the public, the media, and
interest groups-that can bring additional political checks to bear on agen-
cies' decision making.
Part I of this Article lays the descriptive foundation necessary for assess-
ing judicial review of agency science. It begins by outlining the relevant
parameters of the APA, calling attention to the spectrum of scrutiny that
courts bring to bear as they examine agencies for reasoned, science-based
decision making. Next, it highlights the importance of the record on review,
paying special attention to the science-specific features of such a record.
This leads to a discussion of science in agencies generally. Even in the ste-
reotypical, academic research setting, science is bound to policy-all the
more so when marshaled to support agency action. Part II locates the mod-
21
ern super-deference case, Baltimore Gas, in its historical and contextual
place. A detailed look at the courts' subsequent treatment of super deference
demonstrates that the principle has largely lost its teeth. Yet as Part III ar-
gues, this rich array of science-based caselaw provides a basis for thinking
critically about the institutional role courts play with respect to agency sci-
ence. Courts are using their generalist approach in a way that benefits
23. See Shapiro & Levy, Judicial Incentives, supra note 15, at 1064 (describing the "prolif-
eration of manipulable categories to which different degrees of deference apply").
24. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Re-
view, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 753, 761 n.31 (2006) (collecting defenders of hard-look review because it
ensures agency has truly engaged in reasoned decision making); id. at 763-65 (collecting criti-
cisms); see also Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 7, at 1766 (stating most views of
judicial review fall into two camps: those favoring and those disfavoring additional emphasis on
agency procedure).
25. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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administrative law as well as science values. As a normative matter, this
model provides a way to gauge the courts' effectiveness when confronted
with agency science.
I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES: AGENCY SCIENCE IN THE COURTS
Before assessing the role of super deference, it will be helpful to address
a few foundational matters. First, the APA-driven structure of judicial re-
view of agency science provides the background upon which super
deference is built. Second, the roles of science and policy in agency decision
making foreshadow the conceptual weaknesses in super deference. Finally,
there are some special problems in administrative law that have particular
relevance to review of agency science.
A. Judicial Review Under the APA
When courts review agency science, they are operating within the pa-
rameters set forth in the APA. As they have done with many other legislative
enactments, the courts provide meaning to the terms they encounter. The
discussion below describes the basic contours of the APA relevant to judicial
review of agencies' scientific findings, including the judicial gloss applied to
those provisions. While judicial review generally imposes a "reasoned deci-
sion-making" requirement on agencies, "reasonable" is a flexible term.
According to the caselaw, it can mean anything from hard-look review to
Baltimore Gas super deference. Regardless of how strictly a court reviews
an agency, it does so on the basis of a record, the attributes of which are de-
scribed below.
1. APA Basics
The starting place for judicial review of administrative agencies is § 706
of the APA. In particular, the provisions that implicate agencies' scientific
findings, as well as the policy decisions made in light of scientific uncer-
tainty, are §§ 706(A) and (E). These subsections require the reviewing court
to:
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hear-
26ing provided by statute . .. .
26. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E) (2006). Another possibly relevant subsection is § 706(2)(C)
(relating to agency action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
740 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 109:733
While subsection (E) applies by its terms only to "formal" rulemaking
and adjudication-that is, proceedings that produce a closed, trial-like re-
cord 27-Subsection (A) serves as a catch-all standard that generally applies,
for purposes within the scope of this Article, to review of informal adjudica-
tion and rulemaking.
Whether an agency is engaging in rulemaking or adjudication, formal or
informal, the agency will base its decision making on factual information
and policy choices. When agencies must act in the scientific arena, the fac-
tual information will include scientific knowledge, and the policy choices
will necessarily represent decisions made in light of scientific uncertainty.
Although the formality of the agency action will dictate which of the above
standards applies, in practice the two standards are largely indistinguishable
for purposes of judicial review.29 In essence, each simply requires reason-
ableness. The agency must explain its decision in a reasonable way, and the
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.o Notably,
courts will not supply a reasoned basis for an agency's action." The reason-
statutory right"), which may be implicated when courts review agencies' interpretation of their
statutory mandates and apply the Chevron doctrine. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As Chevron itself illustrates, an agency's interpretation of its
ambiguous statutory mandate often implicates the agency's expertise. Id. at 865. Although consid-
eration of the Chevron doctrine would also yield policy decisions made in light of scientific
uncertainty, the statutory-interpretation basis for applying Chevron sets that doctrine beyond the
scope of this Article. Cf Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 585 (2009)
("[T]he effect of each is much the same."). Nevertheless, Chevron has a great deal to say about the
relationship between courts and agencies generally, and to that extent, I draw on Chevron for sup-
port. See, e.g., 467 U.S. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government.... While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices . . . .").
27. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971). Formal
rulemaking and adjudication are governed by §§ 556 and 557 of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c),
554(a) (2006) (specifying the applicability of formal procedures to rulemaking and adjudication,
respectively).
28. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 138-40 (1973) (per curiam) (illustrating the catch-all
approach); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Gover-
nors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (calling arbitrary and capricious provision a
"catchall").
29. See Ass'n of Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683 (the substantial evidence standard is "sep-
arately recited in the APA not to establish a more rigorous standard of factual support but to
emphasize that in the case of formal proceedings the factual support must be found in the closed
record as opposed to elsewhere").
30. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 ("Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency.") (arbitrary and capricious); see also Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (stating that court may not "displace" the agency's
"choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a
different choice had the matter been before it de novo") (substantial evidence). As described in
Overton Park, the arbitrary and capricious standard requires that agencies have made a decision
"based on a consideration of the relevant factors" without "clear error of judgment." 401 U.S. at
416. Substantial evidence, on the other hand, means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938); see also Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487-88 (APA requires reviewing courts to consider
the whole record to ascertain substantiality).
31. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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ableness standard is thus meant to help ensure that the agency has acted with
deliberation by considering its action in a careful, logical way.3 2
This "reasoned decision-making" requirement pervades administrative
law. The simplicity of the phrase itself, however, misleadingly masks the
nuances of its application. It is used to describe judicial review that ranges
in intensity from searching hard look to lenient super deference.
For example, a representation of the hard-look doctrine is embodied in
the now-ubiquitous language from Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. :
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise."
State Farm, in which the Court struck down an agency's rescission of
passive-restraint regulations for automobiles, has been called "a strong en-
dorsement of quite aggressive judicial review of agency action . . . ."" It is
characterized by its extremely detailed and critical discussion of the agen-
cy's reasoning, though its remedy-a remand to the agency to explain itself
anew-is typical.37
Just prior to State Farm, however, the Supreme Court handed down Bal-
timore Gas and announced the modem super-deference principle, all within
the rubric of "reasoned decision making."" As described more fully below,
that case involved a National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") challenge
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC") decision to treat nuclear-
waste disposal issues generically for purposes of licensing individual
nuclear power plants." The generic assumption at the root of the challenge
was that the resulting nuclear waste could be stored in such a way as to
32. See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 7, at 1778 ("The standard legal justifi-
cation for the reasoned decisionmaking requirement is that it promotes rationality, deliberation, and
accountability.").
33. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(using term "reasoned decision-making").
34. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
35. Id. at 43.
36. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1129
(1987). But see Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 7, at 1782-83 (explaining State Farm's
approach as connected to congressional monitoring).
37. See 463 U.S. at 57.
38. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983). For now,
I simply describe Baltimore Gas and the super-deference principle. For a critical examination of that
case, see infra Section II.B.
39. 462 U.S. at 89-90.
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eliminate any releases of radioactive material. 0 In upholding this "zero-
release" assumption, the Court emphasized that deference was particularly
warranted:
[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making pre-
dictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science.
When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to sim-
ple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential."
Thus, there is a spectrum of deference within the umbrella of "reason-
ableness." While later Sections provide a discussion of the problems
associated with singling out science for the special, super-deferential end of
the spectrum, it is worth noting at this point that the Court's mixed signals
about the meaning of "reasoned decision making" have perplexed many
administrative-law observers.42
Even so, some principles frame the discussion. Broadly, agency science
is reviewed for arbitrariness or for substantial evidence. In either case,
courts will look for reasoned decision making (although this standard is
flexible, to say the least). Two further points are relevant here. First, some
courts apply a different formulation to mixed questions of law and fact on
review of formal agency proceedings. That formulation, expressed in the
pre-APA opinion NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. ,4 asks whether the
agency's action has "warrant in the record" and "a reasonable basis in law.""
Again, the hallmark of this test is reasonableness. Second, some agencies'
statutory mandates specify substantial evidence as the governing standard
and may set forth additional substantive standards. 45 For purposes of the
discussion that follows, I will note any particular nuances that may alter the
standard of review, but otherwise the cross-cutting, deferential reasonable-
ness approach enables us to focus on the particular scientific and policy
decisions at issue in a wide range of examples.
2. The Record on Review
What science do courts have before them when they engage in a reason-
ableness review of agency actions? The general principle, applicable in
scientific cases as well as others, is that courts are limited to the record pro-
40. Id. (describing the "zero-release" assumption).
41. Id. at 103.
42. See supra note 15 (collecting sources).
43. 322 U.S. 1 t(1944).
44. Id. at 131.
45. E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2006) (requiring the
"best available evidence" in promulgating exposure standards for toxic materials or harmful physi-
cal agents); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2006) (requiring the "latest scientific
knowledge" for water quality criteria); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2006) (requiring the
"latest scientific knowledge" for air quality criteria documents).
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duced by the agency itself.46 Thus, even if an agency is not required to un-
dertake a formal decision-making process (which would generate a closed
record), a reviewing court will consider the record that was before the agen-
cy at the time it made its decision. Further, a court should normally not
consider evidence outside of the record when confronting a challenge to
agency action.47 This important feature distinguishes administrative law
from other proceedings that arise in the courts where science may be at is-
sue: unlike the typical trial scenario, courts reviewing agencies normally do
not engage in any de novo examinations of scientific issues.
The record requirement is justified by its role in enhancing accountabil-
ity and transparency. Yet agencies' records might consist of thousands of
pages of information.48 Where science is at issue, the record may include
expert affidavits, letters from scientific and other interested organizations,
published and unpublished scientific studies, scientific data produced or
compiled by the agency or other agencies, and scientists' and policymakers'
assessments of all the foregoing. 49 The record and reasoned decision-making
requirements together are meant to enhance the legitimizing administrative-
law values of deliberation, accountability, and transparency.
B. Constructing the Record: The Scientific Enterprise in Agencies
If a record is to support science-informed agency action, that record
must include science. But science in agencies is far removed from the ste-
reotypical academic research setting. Although traditional science is infused
with policy decisions, agency science is even more so because it is con-
ducted for different purposes. That is, agency science is marshaled to fulfill
legal standards in statutes consistent with executive-branch policy. Using
concrete examples, this Section briefly describes where those policy deci-
sions fit in the scientific decision-making process generally. Next, this
Section focuses on common sources of agency science, which support the
notion that science in agencies is a unique construct. The bottom line is that
where there is scientific uncertainty, policy must fill the gap, even more so
46. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see also
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) ("In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party . . . .").
47. There are some narrow exceptions. For example, if a proponent alleges an agency ig-
nored a significant aspect of the problem, that proponent may seek to have evidence admitted that
would be relevant to the agency's failings. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 46
F.3d 1437, 1447 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing exceptions to the record evidence rule). That evidence
would be subject to the principles set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 479 (1993). See, e.g., Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. Jacoby, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1223-24 (D.
Or. 1998) (applying Daubert to extra-record evidence); cf infra text accompanying notes 109-111
(distinguishing Daubert's trial context from that of administrative law).
48. See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98 &
n. 11 (1983) (describing the "sheer volume" of proceedings). On the dangers that too much informa-
tion poses to administrative-law values, see Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure,
and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010).
49. For a discussion of how agencies generate this science, see infra Section I.B. 1.
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in agencies than in the "pure" scientific community. As discussed later, these
attributes have important implications for judicial review of agency science.
1. The Role of Policy in Science
Legal institutions and the citizenry at large suffer from a science obses-
sion, assuming that if only we had answers from science, we would know
what regulatory decisions are "correct.",o Certainly, our institutions ought to
do their best to incorporate good science into decision making, but the ulti-
mate decisions that must be made are policy choices." Not only that, but
policy informs everything from how an experiment is designed to how re-
sults are interpreted and communicated. I find it helpful to characterize the
necessary policy decisions as falling in any of three categories: "meta-
policy" choices, which relate to ultimate decisions; "mesopolicy" choices,
which relate to interpretive and communicative decisions; and "protopolicy"
choices, which relate to interstitial decisions like experiment design.52 Taken
together, the science and the policy choices comprise an agency's scientific
determination-and as will be discussed later, litigation directed at agency
science typically involves challenges to these policy choices, rather than to
science itself.
"Metapolicy" describes the ultimate regulatory decision made in light of
scientific uncertainty. It is informed by scientific information (some types of
which I describe below) but is shaped by the normative goals of statutory
mandates as well as political pressures. A regulation is the paradigmatic
example of metapolicymaking. For example, when the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration ("OSHA") sets a workplace exposure limit, it
might have assessed a number of toxicological studies that frame results in
probabilistic terms. But none of those studies gives an answer to the question
of what the best limit is. Rather, OSHA must consider the requirements of its
statutory mandate, the current administration's policy goals, the costs and
benefits of regulation, and the like, in addition to the limited scientific infor-
50. See generally Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 10, at 1260 ("In short, EPA's use of a
science-based rhetoric enabled it to avoid responsibility for providing any clear, consistent reasons
for its policy choices in setting air quality standards."); Meazell, supra note 6, at 251 (collecting
sources); Daniel Sarewitz, The Rightful Place ofScience, ISSUES IN SO. & TEcH., Summer 2009, at
89 (collecting examples from early in the Obama Administration).
51. I define "policy" broadly to include courses of action selected from among alternatives in
light of such factors as professional judgment, institutional and cultural norms, and external pres-
sures.
52. Professor Wagner has illustrated similar concepts in what she has termed the "zigzag
between science and science policy." Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the
Debate Over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP.
PRos., Autumn 2003, at 63, 65 [hereinafter Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction].
53. Doremus, supra note 9, at 290 ("Political choices cannot be removed from the process.
Instead of trying to remove them, it would be more helpful to focus on making the political elements
of these decisions more transparent.").
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mation, in coming up with a single number that regulates workplace expo-
54
sure.
If the ultimate regulatory decision is metapolicy, the decision about how
to interpret and communicate scientific findings is an intermediate step-
hence the term "mesopolicy."5' Consider this example: Science is uncertain
about the effects on human health associated with very low levels of radio-
56
active exposure. The same body of data has led scientists to three
reasonable, but divergent conclusions. First, it may be that adverse health
effects increase proportionally with increasing levels of exposure, regardless
of the level of exposure. Second, it may be that very few adverse health im-
pacts are seen at low levels, until the exposure reaches some boundary
amount that causes significant and increasing adverse health effects. Finally,
it may be that low levels of exposure cause adverse health impacts, but those
51impacts do not increase significantly with increasing levels of exposure.
The point is not which of these is correct; rather, the point is that reasonable
scientists, exercising scientific judgment, will disagree on how to interpret
and communicate the very same set of data."
Finally, "protopolicy" refers to the judgments scientists make while
conducting science. These might be decisions about such things as what to
include or exclude in an experiment, what parameters to set for a model, the
choice of measurement techniques, or intentional or even unknowing as-
sumptions. 59 The scientific method does not reveal the "right" choices to
make at these junctures; these issues transcend science and represent inter-
stitial policy choices. Consider, for example, a study to determine whether
contaminant levels in a stream are likely to exceed a regulatory standard."
54. This example is based on Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Inst.
(Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980), discussed infra text accompanying notes 162-171.
55. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Sci-
ence: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing
Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 897, 932 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, Our Science]
("[P]olicy nearly always drives the inferences that an expert draws from scientific studies.").
56. In his pathbreaking work, nuclear physicist Alvin M. Weinberg coined the term "trans-
science" to describe questions that, while capable of being posed in scientific terminology, "are
unanswerable by science; they transcend science." Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science,
10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972). Examples of trans-scientific questions stem from his work in the
nuclear industry and include the biological effects of very low-dose contaminant exposures; the
probability of extremely improbable events; the judgments that must be used to make decisions
when thorough data is unavailable; and value choices between different types of science. See id. at
210-13.
57. An illustration and discussion of these possible dose-response curves is set forth in Carol
L. Silva & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, The Precautionary Principle in Context: U.S. and E.U. Scien-
tists'Prescriptions for Policy in the Face of Uncertainty, 88 Soc. Sai. Q. 640, 641 (2007).
58. Doremus, supra note 14, at 1624 ("Scientific integrity allows for the honest difference of
opinion.").
59. See Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflict in Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions for
the Law-Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J.
257, 291 (2008) ("[Tlhis is a fundamental aspect of the scientific study of complex, non-ideal sys-
tems.").
60. For a detailed presentation of this example, see David E. Adelman, Two Models for Sci-
entific Transparency in Environmental Law, in RESCUING SCIENCE, supra note 8, at 201-03.
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Where little empirical information is available about the stream, the logic of
Bayes' theorem might prove useful for inductively assessing that probabil-
ity." Bayes' theorem, however, requires an initial scientific judgment about
the system being studied, or the "prior distribution." In the stream example,
an industry scientist might assume the prior distribution involves low con-
centrations of the contaminant; by applying Bayes' theorem to a limited
number of actual samples, the result would suggest that the most probable
mean contaminant levels would fall below the regulatory standard." A scien-
tist from an environmental group, on the other hand, might assume a higher
prior distribution that results in the most probable mean exceeding the regu-
latory standard.
In providing these examples, I do not mean to suggest there is anything
inherently wrong with such policy choices.64 To the contrary, they cannot be
avoided, and good scientific practice involves documenting those choices,
providing transparency and accountability.65 It may not be possible to isolate
every policy decision that has been made,6 but to the extent one can identify
specific junctures that involve policy, the norms of the scientific community
demand disclosure. This is fortuitous for observers of administrative law
because the legitimizing values of transparency and accountability provide
axes on which administrative-law and scientific values are aligned.
Given that agencies are tasked with making policy decisions and must
do so using data that is already intertwined with policy, it is not surprising
that their scientific records can vary widely. Although some agencies do
conduct their own research, most information is collected and synthesized
from outside sources." During the rulemaking process, for example, any
61. Id. at 201. For more on Bayesian analysis, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIs 600-25 (6th ed. 2008) (presenting Bayesian techniques); ANDREw GELMAN ET AL.,
BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIs 3 (2d ed. 2004) ("The essential characteristic of Bayesian methods is
their explicit use of probability for quantifying uncertainty in inferences based on statistical data
analysis.").
62. Adelman, supra note 60, at 202.
63. Id. Ultimately, sufficient sampling and testing should make the Bayesian predictions
from these two approaches converge.
64. By contrast, scholars have documented policy-driven abuses of the scientific process
itself. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 14, at 1609-13 (describing censorship of scientific informa-
tion); Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1640-50 (describing intentional and premeditated
instances of science charade).
65. See Adelman, supra note 60, at 212 ("Careful explanation of experimental results is a
fundamental principle of science.").
66. Cosens, supra note 59, at 292 ("[Llaw, agency policy, and scientific judgment may all
play a role in reaching a single decision. Separating them for the sake of transparency, as recom-
mended by some, may not be so easily done.").
67. See JASANOFF, supra note 10, at 77 ("[Riegulatory science includes a substantial compo-
nent of knowledge synthesis.") (italics omitted); Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of
Science in Environmental Law: Why We Should, Why We Don't, and How We Can, 86 TEx. L. REV.
1527, 1565 (2008) ("EPA gets most of its scientific information from outside of the agency."); Tho-
mas 0. McGarity, The Complementary Roles of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in
Producing and Using Policy-Relevant Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1028-29 (2007)
("The agencies have become repositories for huge amounts of scientific information that they may
use in taking regulatory action or disseminate to the public by way of warnings or cautionary state-
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interested parties may take advantage of the opportunity for comment by
61
submitting scientific information. Indeed, agencies may specifically re-
quest such information in their notices of proposed rulemaking. 9 Agencies
sometimes fund studies or work under cooperative agreements to develop
data. 0 Many also have internal peer review policies and science advisory
consulting requirements.72 All of this information ultimately comprises the
record.
But even with such a broad record, agency science differs significantly
from pure research science because its purpose is to "further the task of pol-
icy development."73 As a matter of institutional design, government, interest
groups, and regulated entities are heavily involved in the production and
scrutiny of scientific information. Numerous nonscientific internal and
external demands on agencies may color the regulatory science, from im-
posing strict timetables to impacting various meso- and protopolicy
determinations.74
These characteristics relate to the typical justifications for deferential re-
view of agency science, which tend to focus on the policymaking role
ments."); cf J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2006) (advocating regulatory peer review for the "outside evaluation of an administrative
agency's compilation, selection, or use of scientific data to support a proposed regulatory decision
such as a rule, standard, permit, or other policy").
68. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) ("[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportu-
nity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments..."); cf Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law: Reforming the Infor-
mation Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 37, 78 (2006) ("Traditionally, when an agency sets a
pollution standard or takes some other action to protect health or the environment under the envi-
ronmental laws, the agency relies on a broad range of scientific data and studies and describes those
data and studies in the decision that supports its action.").
69. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Listing for the Lar-
getooth Sawfish, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,174 (proposed May 7, 2010) (requesting information "relevant to
the status and conservation of the species"); Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Additional
Sources of Fluorinated GHGs, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,651, 18,654 (proposed Apr. 12, 2010) (requesting
comment on various issues related to fluorinated greenhouse gas emissions); Mandatory Reporting
of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg.
18,575, 18,579 (proposed Apr. 12, 2010) (seeking comment on options for monitoring, reporting,
and verification of potential carbon dioxide leakage) .
70. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING AND MAXIMIZING THE QUALITY, OBJECTIVITY, UTIL-
ITY, AND INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY 6-7 (2002), available at http://epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/EPA
InfoQualityGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter EPA GUIDELINES].
71. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Coop-
erative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270, 34,270
(July 1, 1994); EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 70, at 11 (describing peer review system).
72. E.g., EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 70 at 19; see also Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in
Natural Resource Management: Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L. J. 407
(2008) (exploring the process by which scientific and technical information is produced, expressed,
transmitted, and ultimately incorporated into regulatory decisions).
73. JASANOFF, supra note 10, at 77. Professor Jasanoff has identified numerous differences
between regulatory and research science; for a helpful summary, see id. at 80.
74. See id. at 76-80 (exploring such differences).
Michigan Law Review
bestowed upon the executive branch generally by the Constitution;" the po-
licymaking role bestowed on agencies specifically by Congress;7 and the
participatory elements of agency decision making that enable agencies to at
77least have before them far more scientific information than would a court.
Add to that mix an assumption that agencies are more qualified than courts
to process scientific information,7 and these considerations support what
Professor Jasanoff has called the "science policy paradigm." That is,
(1) agencies should be able to make decisions even on the basis of imperfect
knowledge; (2) a scientific determination may be considered valid even if
there is not universal scientific consensus to that effect; and (3) when ex-
perts disagree about the science, agencies should have the authority to
choose a position consistent with their statutory mandates.
2. Challenges to Agency Science
This discussion highlights a critical question: what should a court do if
an agency gets science wrong? As it turns out, the premise of that ques-
tion-that administrative-law litigation involves challenges to positive
science-is belied by our later examination of the super-deference caselaw.o
Rather, most judicial challenges involve nitpicking at the proto- and meso-
political levels; these are more easily characterized as "scientific" decisions
because they take place when science is being conducted or reviewed, and
hence they seem more amenable to judicial scrutiny than to, say, metapolicy
decisions.
To further illustrate, consider the key features of litigation involving
agency science. Typically, interest groups act as watchdogs to assess agency
75. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .").
76. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)
("Resolution of these fundamental policy questions lies, however, with Congress and the agencies to
which Congress has delegated authority .... .").
77. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 ("The arguments over policy that are advanced in the par-
ties' briefs create the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum a specific
policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency . ... Such policy arguments are more properly
addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges.").
78. For a discussion of science in the courts, see Meazell, supra note 6, at 252-56.
79. JASANOFF, supra note 10, at 50; see also Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82,
91 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The argument that the FCC should create greater safety margins in its guidelines
to account for uncertain data is a policy question, not a legal one. As a policy matter, an agency
confronted with scientific uncertainty has some leeway to resolve that uncertainty by means of more
regulation or less.").
80. See infra Section I.C.
81. For other accounts of this observation, see McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 10, at 1400
("[Commentators] pick apart the agencies' preambles and background documents and launch blun-
derbuss attacks on every detail of the legal and technical bases for the agencies' rules."); Wagner,
Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1657 ("[Advocates] become single-mindedly engaged in present-
ing opposing scientific justifications, demanding outside scientific review, or attacking the
competence of the agency's science when it leads to results that run counter to their own unex-
pressed policy preferences.").
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decisions against the particular groups' policy preferences. To be sure, these
groups monitor agencies and participate in agency lawmaking long before
an action is final and subject to judicial review. But when a final decision
runs counter to a group's policy preferences, a judicial challenge may be the
next step.
Although the challenged decision is likely one of policy, the hallmark of
these lawsuits is the challenger's obsession with the scientific underpinnings
of the agency's decision. The textbook approach is to argue that an agency
used "bad science"-that it ignored important scientific studies, that the
agency's own science involved flawed methodologies, that the agency did
not do enough science, or that the science somehow dictated a different con-
clusion-in essence, that if the science had been "right," a different outcome
would have resulted.
That route is sometimes successful, if for different reasons. For example,
if an agency actually does ignore important studies, rely on seriously flawed
methodology, or reach a conclusion that seems at odds with the relevant
science, and it fails to explain itself in a reasoned manner, it may well face
a remand. This result is simply consistent with the reasoned decision-
making requirement. If the record is fundamentally flawed, it is rightfully
susceptible to a challenge, regardless whether the record contains scientific
12information. At their core, the cases that are most often cited as examples
of bad agency science are usually explained on this basis, or are simply
cases involving metapolicy with which the speaker disagrees.
Indeed, as Professor Wagner has exhaustively demonstrated, there are very
84few examples of agencies actually getting positive science wrong.
Yet these observations do not suggest super deference is justified. Ra-
ther, they support a role for the courts consistent with the basic principles of
reasoned decision making: while a court may not substitute its judgment for
an agency's, it ought to ensure the agency has acted reasonably. If courts fall
prey to the science obsession and give too shallow a look at agency science,
they risk missing not just the rare mistake of positive science, but the
82. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (remand-
ing to agency where, pursuant to Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA set maximum contaminant levels
for chloroform at zero despite widespread scientific consensus that exposure thresholds had been
demonstrated for chloroform).
83. For example, the leading proponents of applying the principles of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Co., 509 U.S. 479 (1993), to judicial review of administrative science cite the
following as examples of bad agency science: Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp.
v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998), rev'd, 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002); Chemical Manufac-
turers Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1994); and Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73
(1st Cir. 1993). See Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert ": A Proposal to
Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles Into Administra-
tive Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 7, 19-20. In only one of those, Chemical
Manufacturers Ass'n, did the agency actually get the science wrong: it treated a solid molecule as if
it were a gas. 28 F.3d at 1266. The other cases may be explained on the basis that the agencies did
not engage in reasoned decision making-not that science was "bad."
84. Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction, supra note 52, at 72-87; see also McGarity, Our Sci-
ence, supra note 55, at 934 ("[Tihere is little evidence that the scientific information that the
agencies are currently using and disseminating is unreliable.").
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failures of reasoned decision making Congress has entrusted the courts with
identifying. Further, even if agencies do relatively well with positive sci-
ence, administrative law contains some trouble spots that have particular
ramifications for judicial review of agency science. Any analysis of super
deference, therefore, would be remiss if it failed to consider those particular
issues both as background building blocks and as normative guideposts-a
task to which I now turn.
C. Ossification, the Science Charade, and the Good Science Movement
Three recurring issues of science in administrative law inform the cri-
tique of super deference: ossification, the science charade, and the good
science movement. Each reveals that super deference has the potential to
deepen problems that are present more broadly in administrative law and to
undermine in particular the goal of incentivizing scientific transparency,
accountability, and deliberation within agencies.
1. Ossification
The ossification hypothesis posits that, among other things, intrusive
standards of judicial review make informal rulemaking increasingly burden-
some and unattractive to agencies.8 ' This undermines administrative-law
values because it incentivizes agencies to choose other, less participatory
regulatory methods, such as using nonlegislative rules. With respect to sci-
ence specifically, the concern is that overly stringent judicial review causes
excessive gathering of scientific data and drawn-out analyses." Essentially,
85. The term is credited to Professor E. Donald Elliott, former general counsel to the EPA.
See E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,125, at 10,134 (2001) (comments of Thomas 0. McGarity). Whether judicial review actu-
ally causes ossification is hotly contested. There are many supporters of that hypothesis. E.g.,
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 49
(1993); McGarity, supra note 17, at 528 ("[Tlhe courts have played a prominent role in the ossifica-
tion of informal rulemaking."); McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 10, at 1419 ("The predictable
result of stringent 'hard look' judicial review of complex rulemaking is ossification."); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) ("With the
exception of a few agencies, the judicial branch is responsible for most of the ossification of the
rulemaking process."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence ofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J.
300, 308-13. There are also numerous detractors. See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited:
Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regu-
latory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld, Why
Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251
(2009).
86. McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 10, at 1386. Empirical studies have had difficulty
verifying this assertion. See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1127-31 ("[A] retreat from rulemaking in the face of stringent judicial review is
not nearly as clear as has been generally supposed."); see also Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political
Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV.
889, 923, 963-64 (2008) (discussing empirical findings suggesting agencies engage in considerable
notice-and-comment rulemaking and are therefore not greatly ossified).
87. Jordan, supra note 85, at 395.
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agencies will make every effort to ensure a thorough record that can with-
stand review the first time around, slowing the process." This particular
prediction, focused on science, would be quite difficult to test empirically,
and it does not appear to have been so tested. 9 Nevertheless, it seems a mat-
ter of common sense that agencies are mindful of the possibility of judicial
review for major rulemakings and would therefore approach rulemaking
more deliberately.
At first blush, it seems that super deference might contribute to deossifi-
cation, at least at the margins. If super deference means courts will not take
a hard look at agency science, agencies should not feel compelled to amass
the volumes of supporting scientific materials that they normally would in
order to justify their decisions. There are at least two problems with this
prediction, however. First, as I demonstrate below, super deference lacks
enough guiding principles to be predictable. Moreover, it is difficult to pre-
dict whether a court will actually use super deference; the enduring
prevalence of the hard-look approach would likely incentivize agencies to
err on the side of more, not less, scientific record-building at the decision-
making stage.
Second, super deference could provide a counterincentive that exacer-
bates the ossification problem and undermines administrative-law values: if
agencies know scientific determinations get the most deference, they might
logically increase the amount of scientific data underpinning their decisions
to ensure those decisions will be classified by the courts as "scientific de-
terminations." As discussed below, this is a major feature of the science
charade. And indeed, early criticisms of Baltimore Gas made this very
point.9 This approach does nothing to further transparency, as it obfuscates
the true bases for decisions. Nor does it further participation: if the public is
already daunted by the amount of science in agency decision making, add-
ing more, unnecessary science surely does not help.
2. The Science Charade
The "science charade" posits that agencies cloak policy decisions in a
shroud of science, exaggerating the role of science to the detriment of ad-
ministrative-law values, statutory goals, and science itself.9' As Professor
Wagner explains in her illuminating work on toxic risk regulation, agency
scientists and bureaucrats fail to identify the gaps left by uncertain science
92
or to reveal the policy choices made to fill those gaps. This might take the
form of agency scientists searching indefinitely for scientific answers that
88. McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 10, at 1400-01; see also id. at 1401 ("The courts can
also impose analytical requirements in a more direct way by reading into agency statutes analytical
obligations not obvious in Congress's words.").
89. See Jordan, supra note 85, at 395.
90. See infra text accompanying note 176.
91. The classic account is Professor Wagner's Science Charade, supra note 9.
92. Id. at 1629.
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do not exist, or of scientists inserting their own policy choices into their ana-
lyses but characterizing their results as based only on science.3 The science
charade might also involve intentional or even premeditated characteriza-
tions of decisions as based on science even if those decisions are really
somewhat arbitrary.9 These behaviors undercut transparency because they
do not make clear precisely how an agency reached its decision. They also
hinder participation and accountability because they drown policy choices in
-95inaccessible science.
Several legal incentives have been blamed for the charade, the most im-
portant for our purposes being the parameters of judicial review.96 As
explained above, the reasoned decision-making requirement means that
courts expect agencies to explain their decisions in a reasonable way. Agen-
cies must therefore support their scientific decisions with scientific
evidence. If agencies know courts will look for scientific explanations for
scientific determinations, the agencies are incentivized to err on the side of
amassing large volumes of science in the record. This leads to the under-
representation of the myriad policy decisions being made, which are not
considered scientific and thus do not seem to support scientific determina-
tions. Furthermore, this amassing of science feeds into the ossification
hypothesis: if agencies are spending more time creating large records and
obscuring the true bases for their decisions, they are necessarily slowing
down the rulemaking process.
As it does with ossification, super deference would seemingly contribute
to the science charade. If agencies know that courts will be at their most
deferential when reviewing scientific determinations, they will rationally
emphasize the scientific aspects of their decisions to the detriment of clearly
identifying the policy decisions filling the scientific gaps.
93. Id. at 1632.
94. Id. at 1640, 1644.
95. See id. at 1674-77.
96. Other possibilities include the public participation requirement of the APA, id. at 1654-
55, perverse incentives set up through interest group oversight, id. at 1657, and science-based legis-
lative mandates, id. at 1667.
97. There has been some suggestion that agencies are punished if they make explicit that
they have made policy choices in light of scientific uncertainty. Id. at 1663 & n.183. But in light of
the super-deference principle's grounding in the Supreme Court's view that agencies are the appro-
priate policymaking branch-and the Baltimore Gas facts themselves, in which the agency was
forthcoming about scientific uncertainty and policy-it seems that other factors may better explain
remands even where agencies have been explicit. Indeed, Professor Bressman has explained the
remand in State Farm as influenced by the Court's perception that the agency needed to make ex-
plicit the political factors influencing its decision. Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 7, at
1783 ("One message to the agency was to better cloak its politically based decisions in technical
dress. Another was to reveal the political as well as the technical basis for its decisions.").
98. See Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 9, at 1665-66 ("By insisting on technical
justifications on the one hand and pledging not to scrutinize the accuracy of the technical explana-
tions on the other, the courts not only fail to prevent the science charade, they make it almost
obligatory.").
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3. The Good Science Movement
As noted earlier, most judicial challenges to agency science are directed
not so much at the science as at the meta-, meso-, and protopolicy decisions
embedded in the science. Nevertheless, these challenges are often packaged
as "pure" science challenges, with challengers arguing that agencies have
used unreliable "junk" science. In the courts, the junk science debate centers
on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co.9 In the agencies, Daubert
has likewise become the metaphor for "good science." Proposals (and some
reforms) centered on extending Daubert to the administrative-law context
have targeted the agencies themselves,'" executive oversight,' and judicial
review.'02 There has been much debate on the merits of these proposals,'0 3
and there remains the more basic question whether such reforms are neces-
sary in the first place.
Still, most people can probably agree that judicial review ought to rein-
force an agency's use of "good" science as much as possible, while avoiding
the tendency to legitimize "bad" science. In other words, we want our judi-
cial outcomes, as much as our substantive administrative law, to capture the
state of science as accurately as possible.'0 Thus, judicial review of agency
science ought to maximize both good science and administrative-law values.
Related to the science charade, legal rules ought to seek ways to improve
transparency so that science-based policy challenges can be unveiled and
examined for what they really are.
With these points in mind, I highlight one proposed "good science" re-
form for its marked contrast to super deference: regulatory Daubert.
Proponents of this approach argue that courts should engage in Daubert-like
99. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence
702 requires courts to act as gatekeepers to determine whether scientific evidence is reliable and
relevant. Id. at 589.
100. E.g., Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, "Gatekeeping" Agency Reliance on Science and
Technical Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Ability in the Administrative Process,
17 TOURo L. REV. 297, 324-27 (2000) (arguing for a Daubert executive order).
101. Information Quality Act of 2001 ("IQA"), Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-
153-154 (2000); see Johnson, supra note 69, at 41 (criticizing the IQA); Wendy E. Wagner, Import-
ing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J. LAW & POt'Y
589, 597 (2004) (commenting that certain IQA petitions "bear a striking resemblance to Daubert
motions"). Another reform targeting information disclosure is the Shelby Amendment, which re-
quires federal agencies to make research data available to the public in certain circumstances. FY
1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 144 CONG. REC. H11178 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1998).
102. E.g., Raul & Dwyer, supra note 83.
103. Merits, and criticisms, have been extensively debated in the scholarly literature. See, e.g.,
Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction, supra note 52 (criticizing reforms and questioning the premise of
bad science).
104. See Stephen J. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Speech, The
Interdependence of Science and Law (Feb. 16, 1998), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/
yearbook/chap9.htm (revised transcript) (courts ought to aim for decisions that "approximately
reflect the scientific state of the art").
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scrutiny of agency science on judicial review.'05 According to proponents of
Daubertized review, enhanced judicial scrutiny of agency science is necessary
because "agency decisions too often either disregard scientific evidence or
reflect public policy considerations merely masked as science."'0 The Dau-
bert principles, they argue, are consistent with the reasoned decision-making
requirement and would enhance the consistency of judicial review.07
Critics of this approach have far outweighed supporters.'os Daubert, of
course, is inapplicable in a strict sense because it governs admissibility un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence.'" When courts review agencies, by
contrast, that review is usually limited to a record already in existence. More
fundamentally, if Daubert operates as a check on a generalist judiciary (in
the sense that it combats the problem of courts admitting junk science), it
seems odd to think that the generalist judiciary ought to wield it against the
expert agencies."o This is particularly true considering the policy decisions
embedded in agency science and the courts' institutional role vis-A-vis
agencies: Daubert fails to account for these important considerations that go
beyond, for example, private tort litigation."'
Even if courts have rejected invitations to expressly apply Daubert to agen-
cy science, a few have used the "spirit of Daubert" to inform their analysis. That
105. E.g., Raul & Dwyer, supra note 83, at 7 ("Daubert provides a suitable framework for
reviewing the quality of agency science and the soundness of agency decisions...."); Miller &
Rein, supra note 100, at 298 ("In our view, [the Daubert] principles require federal courts reviewing
administrative actions to enforce the same 'gatekeeper' standards as those courts now require when
reviewing a trial court's treatment of scientific and technical evidence.").
106. Raul & Dwyer, supra note 83, at 9.
107. See Elliott et al., supra note 85, at 10, 129-30 (comments of Alan Charles Raul).
108. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, On the Prospect of "Daubertizing" Judicial Review of
Risk Assessment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 155; Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction,
supra note 52.
109. Courts have uniformly concluded that Daubert does not apply to judicial review of agen-
cy action, and have invoked various justifications. See, e.g., Lobsters, Inc. v. Evans, 346 F. Supp. 2d
340, 344 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Daubert and its progeny interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence, how-
ever, and the federal rules of evidence [sic] do not apply to NOAA hearings."); Stewart v. Potts, 996
F. Supp. 668, 678 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("It does not apply to APA review of agency action.... The
agency in this case is the factfinder, and the Court must give a high degree of deference to its exper-
tise."). Another explanation stems from separation-of-powers values. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita,
46 F.3d 606, 622 (7th Cir. 1995) ("While such a proposal might assure better documentation of an
agency's scientific decisions, we think that forcing an agency to make such a showing as a general
rule is intrusive, undeferential, and not required."). Agencies have likewise rejected requests to use
Daubert as part of their rulemakings. See Claire R. Kelly, The Dangers of Daubert Creep in the
Regulatory Realm, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 165, 187-89 (2006) (collecting examples).
110. See Elliott et al., supra note 85, at 10,137 (comments of Richard Pierce) ("Federal judges
don't know much about science. They know a lot less about science than do agencies."); McGarity,
supra note 108, at 156 ("Judges' limited competence in areas involving scientific data and analysis,
complex modeling exercises, and large uncertainties is well recognized in administrative law and
has been effectively demonstrated by the courts themselves in post-Daubert toxic torts opinions.");
Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction, supra note 52, at 97 ("[I]f the courts' scientific competency is less
than that of the party they are reviewing, it is unclear what the courts are contributing to the exer-
cise.").
111. See McGarity, supra note 108, at 156 ("Assigning a Daubert-like gatekeeper role to
courts engaged in judicial review of agency risk assessments is a profoundly bad idea.").
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is, they acknowledge Daubert is not directly applicable but use the Daubert
standard of reliability to assess the weight of the scientific information that was
before an agency when it made its decision. The "spirit of Daubert cases seem
largely confined to the Seventh Circuit and judicial reviews of agency adjudica-
tion,"2 but there is some indication that the concept is spreading."' Moreover, at
least one scholar has warned of a Daubert creep in which courts may be apply-
ing a sort of de facto Daubert analysis without making clear that they are doing
so." 4 This proposition is difficult to test, and the few cases cited for this propo-
sition might be explained as examples of straightforward hard-look review."'
Even so, an implicit Daubertization would be subject to the same criticisms as
an explicit approach, with the additional concern that judicial opinions would
be less transparent.
There are many contrasts to be drawn between super deference and
Daubertization. While Daubert requires judges to act as gatekeepers, assess-
ing scientific evidence against the norms of science itself, super deference
means that courts will defer to the agencies' choices regarding the reliability
of science. Unlike Daubert, super deference does not ask judges to dig
deeply into agency science, recognizing that judges are the generalists and
agencies the experts. And super deference is built on an understanding that
agencies are the proper policymaking institution; it thus avoids the fear that
Daubertization would impermissibly mire judges in policymaking because
agency science is such a policy-laden enterprise. In these senses, then, the
Daubertization debate makes super deference look like a good idea.
Yet this conclusion is not entirely satisfactory. Daubert is directed to re-
liability, not reasonableness, and as discussed above, super deference does
not necessarily identify lack of reason. Further, super deference has its ossi-
fication and science charade shortcomings, and as demonstrated below, it is
undermined in its own right by its context, reasoning, and application. Even
so, the Daubert debate has always been helpful for placing the spotlight on
112. See, e.g., Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding expert should
not have been permitted to testify); Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir.
2005) (invoking "spirit" to reason that nothing in experts' curricula vitae indicated that they were
unqualified); Niam v. Ascroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he spirit of Daubert ... does
apply to administrative proceedings. . .. 'Junk science' has no more place in administrative proceed-
ings that in judicial ones."); Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001)
("An agency must act like an expert if it expects the judiciary to treat it as one.").
113. See, e.g., McElmurray v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1325 (S.D. Ga.
2008) ("While Daubert does not apply to agency decisions in any formal respect, the principles
underlying that decision do apply." (citing Pasha, 433 F.3d at 535)).
114. See Kelly, supra note 109.
115. See Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); Miller & Rein, supra note
100, at 316-18 (citing Cellular Phone Taskforce for proposition that courts are implicitly applying a
Daubert review model); see also U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
187 F.3d 384, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding in 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) support for the proposition that
ALJs must perform "a gate keeping function while assessing evidence to decide the merits of a
claim").
judicial strengths and weaknesses vis-f-vis science. The problem, then, is
fitting the generalist judiciary understanding arising from Daubert together
with the very different context of judicial review of agency science.
II. SUPER DEFERENCE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
As is already clear, agencies enjoy considerable deference from courts
when they act within their expertise. For political and practical reasons, this
makes sense. Not only are agencies accountable to the elected executive, but
they have been created largely by Congress for the purpose of performing
the work of experts. Both these characteristics serve a legitimizing function
and provide authority for agencies to make policy decisions. Courts, on the
other hand, involve unelected, generalist judges; while the judicial check
also serves to legitimize agencies, §§ 706(2)(A) and (D) of the APA set lim-
its on the scope of judicial scrutiny.
Even though, as a baseline matter, agencies receive great deference, the
super-deference principle considers agencies' scientific and technical en-
deavors as deserving of even more deference. This Part begins by tracing the
origins of super deference, revealing that it is in some ways an anomaly
born of the legal climate and the nuclear energy debate. Next, the Part eva-
luates the flagship super-deference case, Baltimore Gas, in detail,
illustrating further the principle's singularity. Taken with the concerns raised
above, this analysis leaves little to commend super deference from a theo-
retical perspective. Turning to a practical perspective, this Part evaluates
major super-deference opinions and finds little in the way of principled ap-
plication.
A. Historical Antecedents and Deference to Agency Expertise
To understand the context of Baltimore Gas, it is important to start with
the rise of modem administrative law from the New Deal and the enactment
of the APA."'7 Coming on the heels of the Lochner era,"' the post-New Deal
period reflected an expertise model of administrative law."' There was, at
this time, great faith in the "ability of experts to develop effective solutions
116. See generally Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study ofScientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005) (so concluding).
117. For a detailed account of administrative law beginning in the 1800s, see Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); see also Bressman,
supra note 7, at 1758-67 (describing progression of eras in administrative law); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (providing a
descriptive and a critical historical account).
118. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a detailed historical account of rate-
making, its interplay with the Lochner era, and its ultimate demise in what I consider to be a
super-deference predicate case, Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944), see Steven Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984).
119. Bressman, supra note 7, at 1759; see also Stewart, supra note 117, at 1678.
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to the economic disruptions created by a market system."l 20 Indeed, eco-
nomic regulations were the most common, such as those governing
ratemaking by railroads and utilities.'"' Judicial review was characterized by
great deference on account of the agencies' expertise.
Things had changed by the late 1960s and 1970s, however. Congress en-
acted a sweeping array of health, safety, and environmental statutes such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Act,122 the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 12 the Clean Air Act,' 24 the Clean Water Act,125 and the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act. Suddenly agencies were doing much more than
making the economic predictions that had been their bread and butter since
the New Deal; they were being asked to set standards under significant sci-
entific uncertainties, where the stakes were potentially life-and-death.
Agencies were making procedural changes as well. While adjudication
had been a staple of agency policymaking, agencies were now using infor-
mal rulemaking as the primary vehicle for setting policy.127 As noted earlier,
the governing APA provision, § 553, provides far fewer requirements for
informal rulemaking than the formal requirements set forth in §§ 556-57.
Thus, informal procedures provided more efficient means for agencies to
make law, and agencies took advantage of those procedures in the face of
dramatically increased workloads.
Since the New Deal, judicial review had taken a laissez-faire approach
to agencies, who after all were viewed as experts in administering what was
largely economic regulation. But as Congress began mandating specific pro-
tective standards, it seemed that perhaps agencies needed to arrive at the
120. Rabin, supra note 117, at 1266-67.
121. For example, the Hope Natural Gas Court explained its deferential approach:
It is not the theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate
order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.
The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then im-
portant. Moreover, the Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact that
it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of validity.
320 U.S. at 602.
122. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1592
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006)).
123. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2051-84 (2006)).
124. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01-7671q (2006)).
125. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006)).
126. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006)).
127. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review,
59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 375 (1974); see also McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 10, at 1385 (call-
ing 1970s "rulemaking era"). This change was also facilitated by the Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), which established a pre-
sumption against formal rulemaking.
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"Right Answer."128 And as agencies used less formal procedures for arriving at
their answers, it seemed to many courts that there was not enough information
available when it came to judicial review.129 Against this backdrop, the judi-
ciary made an important shift critical to understanding super deference.
This shift moved the courts from deference to agency expertise to a pe-
riod of both substantive scrutiny and the imposition of additional procedure.
In fact, two camps emerged, one advocating substantive methods and the
other procedural methods for achieving meaningful judicial review.'3 The
substantive approach, exemplified by Judge Leventhal's opinion in Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,"' required that agencies be prepared to
defend their methodologies as "reliable," and encouraged courts to delve
deeply into the agencies' scientific and technical determinations.132 The sec-
ond camp, exemplified by Judge Bazelon's concurrence in International
Harvester, worried that courts lacked the technical expertise to scrutinize
agency science so carefully;' 3 instead, this camp espoused court-imposed
procedures meant to ensure "a reasonable decision-making process." 3 4
This latter approach-imposing procedures on agencies beyond those
required by the APA-became known as "hybrid rulemaking."' And of
critical importance, Baltimore Gas's pedigree includes the landmark case
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.,"' in which the Supreme Court rejected judicially imposed hybrid
rulemaking procedures."' Vermont Yankee involved the Natural Resources
Defense Council's ("NRDC") challenge to the NRC's grant of a license
128. Rabin, supra note 117, at 1311; see also Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("It is in this perspective that we have not flinched from our discussion of
the economic and ecological risks inherent in a 'wrong decision' by the Administrator."). Note that
the industry capture model of agency behavior also gained ground during this period, raising skepti-
cism about agencies' abilities to regulate solely in the public interest. See ROGER G. NOLL,
REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALs 40-43 (1971).
129. See Rabin, supra note 117, at 1309 ("[T]he courts were centrally concerned with the
question of how to control effectively the exercise of administrative discretion in the singularly
perplexing cases of scientific and technological complexity. Deference to traditional processes of
informal rulemaking and adjudication in such cases appeared to be tantamount to surrendering the
function of judicial review.").
130. Id. at 1307. Note how the modem Daubertization debate echoes these themes. Supra text
accompanying notes 99-111.
131. 478 F.2d 615.
132. Id. at 645, 647.
133. Id. at 651 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("I recognize that I do not know enough about
dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide whether or not
the government's approach to these matters was statistically valid. Therein lies my disagreement
with the majority.").
134. Id.
135. See Clark Byse, Comment, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Proce-
dure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (1978) (calling hybrid rulemaking
an "unwholesome trend").
136. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
137. See Rabin, supra note 117, at 1309 (calling Vermont Yankee "[tihe key case that ques-
tioned an expansive conception of judicial review" that had arisen in this era).
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(under the predecessor to the Baltimore Gas zero-release assumption) to
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation to operate a nuclear power
plant.' The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded because it perceived defi-
ciencies in the agency's rulemaking procedures."9 As the court explained, it
could not perform its duty to review the administrative record because in-
adequate procedures led to underdeveloped factual issues regarding waste
disposal.'4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts may not impose proce-
dures on agencies beyond those found in the APA. In so doing, the Court
emphasized that agencies are better situated than courts to design proce-
dures appropriate for their respective regulated entities.141 More specifically,
the Court invoked separation-of-powers concerns by rooting its analysis in
the institutional structure whereby Congress entrusts agencies with substan-
tive functions. 14 It specifically rejected NRDC's argument that courts were
free to require extra procedures, when, among other things, the agency's
proposed rule addressed complex or technical factual issues.'43 Essentially,
the Court was concerned that judicially imposed procedures interfered with
Congress's design of the APA, which left considerable discretion to agencies
as to the format for informal rulemaking.'44 Further, the possibility of such
hybrid procedures stood to undermine the values of uniformity and predict-
ability.145 The Court remanded for review of whether the original rule had
support in the administrative record; ultimately, the NRC adopted the zero-
release rule which was then challenged in the D.C. Circuit, and this time
reviewed substantively under the name Baltimore Gas.146
138. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519. In a second decision also before the Supreme Court in
Vermont Yankee, the D.C. Circuit had remanded a decision of the NRC to grant a permit to construct
another plant to Consumers Power Company. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (1976).
139. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub
nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
140. Id. at 654.
141. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524-25 (citing FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290
(1965)).
142. Id. at 525. Indeed, the Court cited its opinion in SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947), for the proposition that allowing court-imposed procedures would "propel the court into the
domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency."
143. 435 U.S. at 545.
144. Id. at 548.
145. Id. at 546-47.
146. See Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 92-95
(1983) (describing history). Note that Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas were part of a broader
progression toward great deference that ushered in the presidential era of administrative law. See
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2246-49 (2001). As exempli-
fied by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), this
model grounds administrative law in the president's accountability and constitutional policymaking
role. See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 7, at 1764 (describing presidential control
model of administrative law as reflected by increasing judicial deference to agency decisions, the
most prominent example being Chevron). Taken together, these cases represent a Court growing
more willing to once again revert to deference to agencies on matters within their expertise.
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B. Baltimore Gas Scrutinized
As noted above, Baltimore Gas involved another challenge to the NRC's
"zero-release assumption."147 Recall that the rule required licensing boards
deciding whether to license nuclear power plants to make the generic as-
sumption that permanent storage of certain nuclear waste would have no
impact on the environment; that is, there would be zero chance of release.148
Following the Vermont Yankee remand, the substantive reasonableness of that
assumption was at the heart of the case.149
The NRC had acknowledged that the risks of a long-term repository fail-
ure were uncertain. 'o However, it predicted that an appropriate site could be
found that would maintain its integrity, and it also explained that the optimism
of the zero-release assumption would be offset by other more precautionary
assumptions that licensing boards were required to make."' The D.C. Circuit
held that the zero-release assumption was arbitrary and capricious.'52 Because
the NRC had failed to factor the uncertainties surrounding the assumption into
the licensing process in such a way that it could potentially be outcome-
determinative in an individual licensing proceeding, the appellate court rea-
soned, the assumption failed NEPA's requirement that an agency consider all
significant environmental risks from its proposed action.' Alternatively, the
assumption required licensing boards to ignore factors relevant to NEPA,
which was a clear error in judgment and therefore arbitrary and capri-
CIOUS.15
The Supreme Court rejected these rationales, citing three factors as criti-
cally important. First, the zero-release assumption was established for a very
limited purpose, and other more comprehensive programs had been created
for the broader purpose of evaluating long-term waste disposal technolo-
gies."' Second, the assumption was a single figure in an entire table, and the
overall table represented a precautionary, over-conservative approach.
Next, the Court made its super-deference pronouncement:
[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making pre-
dictions, within its special area of expertise, at the frontiers of science.
When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to sim-
147. 462 U.S. at 89-90.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 92.
150. Id. at 94.
151. Id. at 94-95. The agency also rejected the option of having licensing boards reconsider
those uncertainties in individual licensing proceedings, explaining that this was a generic question
properly dealt with in rulemaking. Id. at 95-96.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 96.
155. Id. at 101-02.
156. Id. at 102-03.
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ple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most defer-
ential.
Later, the Court emphasized that the zero-release assumption was a pol-
icy judgment':
We are acutely aware that the extent to which this Nation should rely on
nuclear power as a source of energy is an important and sensitive issue.
Much of the debate focuses on whether development of nuclear generation
facilities should proceed in the face of uncertainties about their long-term
effects on the environment. Resolution of these fundamental policy ques-
tions lies, however, with Congress and the agencies to which Congress has
delegated authority, as well as with state legislatures and, ultimately, the
populace as a whole. Congress has assigned the courts only the limited, al-
beit important, task of reviewing agency action to determine whether the
agency conformed with controlling statutes. As we emphasized in our ear-
lier encounter with these very proceedings, "[a]dministrative decisions
should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial
procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute ... , not simply
because the court is unhappy with the result reached."'
Under the Overton Park standard, the agency had considered the relevant
factors and "articulated a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made," and so its action was not arbitrary and capricious."
To assess the strength of the super-deference concept, three observations
regarding the opinion itself are relevant. First, the super-deference principle
was but one of three factors that the Court considered. 16 Viewed as a mere
factor, it was probably not outcome-determinative. Indeed, given the Court's
ultimate emphasis on its belief that the zero-release assumption was a policy
decision, super deference was likely not necessary to the Court's decision at
all. And considering that the agency's decision was made in light of scien-
tific uncertainty, the zero-release assumption was not really a scientific
determination, but a metapolicy choice.
Yet the ultimate emphasis on policy raises questions about a second ob-
servation. In its statement of super deference, the Court distinguished
between "scientific determination[s]" and "simple findings of fact." But
there was neither guidance as to how to delineate the two nor any explana-
tion of the mechanics of applying the Overton Park standard in different
ways for each. Further, why should the distinction matter if the zero-release
assumption was not a scientific determination at all, but rather a policy deci-
sion? Was this statement of super deference almost dictum?
157. Id. at 103.
158. Id. at 105.
159. Id. at 97 (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
160. Id. at 105-06 (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 285-86 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
161. Id. at 101-03.
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This question haunts the opinion, particularly given the final observation
about Baltimore Gas's reasoning: as authority for super deference, the Court
cited the Benzene case. 62 It is a stunning use of authority, because the Ben-
zene decision is known not for its extreme deference, but for the plurality's
poor treatment of science and particularly un-deferential approach.6
In Benzene, the Court struck down OSHA's health standard limiting oc-
cupational exposure to benzene. Reduced to its essence, the opinion took
issue with OSHA's methodology: "The agency made no finding ... that
exposure to benzene at or below the 10 ppm level had ever in fact caused
leukemia."'6 The Court seemed to review the scientific evidence before
OSHA anew, criticizing OSHA's decisions regarding the strength of various
studies and its assumptions regarding risk.
Indeed, as Justice Marshall's dissent in Benzene highlighted, "[t]he criti-
cal problem in cases like the ones at bar is scientific uncertainty."'65 He
emphasized that "judicial review under the substantial evidence test is ulti-
mately deferential"'6 and took the majority to task for substituting its
judgment for that of the agency. Although he acknowledged that judicial
review is difficult where there is a high level of technical complexity, he
emphasized that factual issues may not be subject to any definitive resolu-
tion.'6 And "when the question involves determination of the acceptable
level of risk, the ultimate decision must necessarily be based on considera-
tions of policy as well as empirically verifiable facts." 6 1
Not only does the Benzene plurality fail generally to support any sort of
super deference, the specific portion of the Benzene plurality opinion to
which Baltimore Gas cites fails to support the sweeping regular facts-
scientific determination distinction. The Benzene plurality stated that
OSHA's statutory mandate, which allowed the secretary to regulate on the
basis of the "best available evidence," gave OSHA "some leeway where its
findings must be made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge."'69 Neither
162. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
163. There are numerous criticisms of the case. See, e.g., Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction,
supra note 52, at 119 n.245 (collecting opinions that have cited Benzene for raising the burden of
proof beyond what may be called for in statutory mandates); Elliott et al., supra note 85, at 10,137
(comments of Richard J. Pierce, Jr.) ("Anyone who has had Toxicology 101, even if they got a D in
it, can see that the risk that the [Benzene] court calls trivial is much larger than the risk the court
calls plainly unacceptable. I don't want fools like that messing around with science, and that's the
best of our judiciary.").
164. 448 U.S. at 634.
165. Id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 662 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("These
cases press upon the Court difficult unanswered questions on the frontiers of science and medi-
cine.").
166. Id. at 705 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 705-06.
168. Id. at 706; cf id. at 693 ("[T]he requirement that the Secretary act on the basis of 'the
best available evidence' was intended to ensure that the standard-setting process would not be de-
stroyed by the uncertainty of scientific views.").
169. Id. at 656.
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of the cases cited by the Benzene plurality is particularly valuable for under-
standing the super-deference principle. One, Industrial Union v. Hodgson,
merely states the core of Overton Park in another way: "[W]hen the Secre-
tary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist
or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on
to identify the considerations he found persuasive." 0 The other, Society of
the Plastics Industry v. OSHA, simply cited Hodgson for the proposition that
the secretary permissibly established a conservative exposure threshold in
light of scientific uncertainty.17
The dubious necessity of, and support for, the super-deference principle
as stated in Baltimore Gas, coupled with its historical background and Ver-
mont Yankee pedigree, makes it possible to draw two rather different
conclusions. On one hand, Baltimore Gas's strong language could be
viewed as a signal that the Supreme Court was retreating from its tolerance
of extreme substantive scrutiny exemplified by the Leventhal approach, and
evidenced by the Court itself in cases like Benzene.172 On the other hand, it
could simply have been a strongly worded rebuke to the D.C. Circuit to stop
getting in the way of the NRC.173 Neither possibility is particularly satisfy-
ing, and neither explains the mysterious distinction made in Baltimore Gas
between "scientific determination[s], as opposed to simple findings of
fact." 74
Baltimore Gas received surprisingly little scholarly attention. Some
commentators, critical of super deference, attempted to confine that princi-
ple to the nuclear policy debate: "[The case] sets no standard of agency
behavior, but instead disrupts the institutional balance by reaffirming the
Court's past practice of blocking judicial oversight of nuclear power regula-
tion."'7 Yet the commentary also raised a more generalized concern familiar
to current observers of the science charade: a highly deferential approach to
scientific and technical determinations incentivizes agencies to cloak their
170. Industrial Union v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see id. at 474
("[S]ome of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge . .. . Decision making must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent
upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual analysis.").
171. 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975).
172. See Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
389, 409 n.81 (1985) (commenting that Justice O'Connor's restraint in Baltimore Gas was consis-
tent with her opposition to the judiciary's undertaking scientific judgment in abortion cases).
173. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 362 (arguing that the years immediately following Balti-
more Gas saw a trend illustrating "the courts' general unwillingness to exercise a significant role in
overseeing the operation of the nuclear power industry"); Yellin, supra note 12, at 1320 n.128 (call-
ing Baltimore Gas cases "shadow versions of the debate about the legitimacy and long-term
viability of the commercial nuclear power industry in which the courts have no institutional role").
174. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
175. Yellin, supra note 12, at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Paul Weinstein, Note, Substan-
tive Review Under NEPA After Vermont Yankee IV, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 837, 879 (1985)
(confining super-deference language to the case's facts and noting that "it entailed a decision by the
NRC on whether that agency would continue to carry on a major function long committed to it-the
decision of whether to continue to license nuclear reactors").
true reasoning behind an unassailable mantle of science. 76 Even so, the ini-
tial scholarly responses to Baltimore Gas-appearing from 1983 though
1987-had little caselaw from which to assess how Baltimore Gas would
impact judicial review of agency science. 77 With the benefit of nearly thirty
years of super deference, we can now make that assessment.
C. Progeny and Modem Applications
A cursory look at super deference in the caselaw suggests the principle
is alive and well because it continues to be cited frequently by courts con-
fronting agency science. The number of citations, however, is misleading.
The Supreme Court has used the principle only once, and-although ini-
tially the courts seemed to take super deference to an extreme-it seems to
have become meaningless boilerplate that obscures what courts are really
doing: hard-look review. Even so, tracing the path of super deference is re-
warding because it suggests a better normative account of the courts' role
with respect to agency science.
1. The Supreme Court
Since Baltimore Gas, the only Supreme Court opinion to cite the super-
deference principle is Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, another
NEPA case. 78 There, the Court upheld the district court's judgment in favor
of the Army Corps of Engineers, where the Corps determined that a sup-
plemental Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") was not necessary to
address information that developed after the preparation of the original EIS.
At issue was the construction of a dam and environmental organizations'
claims that the dam would cause increased turbidity in water downstream
that would impair fishing.'7 ' The Corps' EIS concluded that the proposed
dam might occasionally impair fishing, but ultimately the Corps decided to
proceed with the construction. The environmental organizations argued
176. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 346 n.82 (arguing Baltimore Gas's reference to the "sheer
volume" of proceedings improperly suggested an agency can comply with statutory requirements
merely by amassing paper); id. at 377 ("One possible result of the deference rule is that agencies
will strain to characterize their policy decisions, especially if they are controversial, as resting on
technical or scientific judgments."); Yellin, supra note 12, at 1317-18 ("It remains to be seen wheth-
er as agencies grow more sophisticated in facing reviewing courts, they defeat the adaptive process,
increasing their discretionary powers by drawing more of the real substance of decisions into a
realm that plausibly can be described as the scientific and technological frontier."); see also Stever,
supra note 15, at 68-69 (articulating two concerns about super deference: a "potential for the devel-
opment of a tyranny by bureaucrat-technicians in the absence of strong minded judicial review," and
the possibility that nontechnical bases for decisions may be "obscured by agency lawyers who cloak
the regulation in scientific or technical buzzwords").
177. See generally Siegel, supra note 12, at 361-72 (describing opinions issued between 1983
and 1986 citing the super-deference principle).
178. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
179. Id. at 378-79. Turbidity is a measure of the light that is reflected by material in water; it
is an indirect measure of the amount of suspended matter in the water. See id. at 364 n.2.
180. Id. at 366-67.
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that two new sources of data justified a supplemental EIS: a memo suggest-
ing that the dam would adversely impact downstream fishing based on a
draft study by the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Department and a Soil Conser-
vation Service soil survey that could be interpreted to predict greater
downstream turbidity than the EIS contemplated.18 1
Before turning to the merits, the Court resolved a dispute about the ap-
propriate standard of review. It rejected the organizations' contention that
the issue was primarily a question of law deserving no deference. Instead,
the Court determined that the arbitrary and capricious standard of
§ 706(2)(A) applied. As the Court remarked, this was "a classic example of
a factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency ex-
pertise."182 The Court cited Baltimore Gas for the proposition that because
analysis of the new information requires a high level of expertise, the Court
should defer to the informed discretion of the agency, emphasizing that in
such circumstances, the Court should be at its "most deferential." 8 1
This is an intriguing use of super deference because, rather than apply-
ing it as an exercise in deference, the Court used it as authority for which
deference ought to be applied in choosing from the options set forth in § 706
of the APA. Indeed, when the Court later turned to the merits, it cited Over-
ton Park rather than Baltimore Gas for the standard of review and stated,
"When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion
to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an
original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive."'8 Still,
the Court stated that it was nevertheless important to fulfill the role of judi-
cial review by carefully reviewing the record to ensure the agency had made
a reasoned decision.' 5 The Court did not mention super deference again, and
proceeded to apply an ordinary hard-look-style reasonableness review. As to
the memo, the Corps had determined that its conclusions were based on a
study with faulty methodology; and as to the soil survey, the Corps had un-
dertaken a more detailed study of turbidity issues and considered more
information than a simple soil survey map.'86 The Court therefore concluded
that the Corps had "conducted a reasoned evaluation of the relevant infor-
mation and reached a decision that, although perhaps disputable, was not
arbitrary or capricious.' "
Marsh illustrates that a special super-deference principle is not needed,
and it hints at reasons why. First, the Court was obviously aware of the
Baltimore Gas standard since it cited that case for a different proposition,
181. Id. at 370.
182. Id. at 376.
183. Id. at 377 (citing Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 103 (1983)).
184. Id. at 378 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 382-85.
187. Id. at 385.
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but its omission of that standard in substantive review suggests that it is su-
perfluous. Second, the Court's use of Overton Park provides a justifiable
basis for the omission. As the Court applied Overton Park, agencies were
the specialists entitled to rely on their expertise to engage in reasoned deci-
sion making. While this standard was deferential-it accounted for the
Corps' scientific and technical knowledge and did not dig deeply into its
methodology-the Court nevertheless required the Corps to explain itself
reasonably.
It is also notable that, even though the Court has encountered agencies'
scientific determinations in the years following Marsh, it has never elabo-
rated on the super-deference standard;'8 yet in none of those cases does the
super-deference principle appear. This stands in marked contrast to the
Court's ongoing willingness to defer to legislatures in matters of science,
even when the legislature got some of the science wrong.
Lower-court opinions do continue to cite Baltimore Gas and the super-
deference principle. Viewed as a whole, they appear to demonstrate a trend
towards reduced deference. At the same time, they fail to demonstrate any
norms of principled application or, for that matter, any guiding consensus at
all.
2. Initial Lower-Court Responses
As described above, Baltimore Gas's nuclear-policy context is an impor-
tant dimension to the case. Although left tacit in Baltimore Gas, the courts
have long envisioned for themselves a "very limited role ... in the statutory
scheme regulating the construction and operation of commercial nuclear
power plants."'" This heritage made the super-deference principle easy to
188. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376-78 (2008) (up-
holding the Navy's use of mid-frequency active sonar in training exercises against a challenge that
such sonar harmed marine mammals); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,
496-501 (2004) (upholding, under § 706(2)(A), the EPA's stop-construction orders where the agen-
cy concluded that the state permitting authority made unreasonable determinations under the Clean
Air Act); cf Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999) (holding the substantial evidence stan-
dard applies on judicial review of Patent and Trademark Office findings; rejecting, inter alia, the
argument that a stricter clearly erroneous standard would encourage better-developed administrative
records). The Supreme Court has infrequently cited Baltimore Gas for the proposition that NEPA
assures the public that an agency has considered environmental impacts. E.g., Dep't of Transp. v.
Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (holding that an agency is not bound by NEPA); Robertson
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (holding that the agency complied
with NEPA's mandate).
189. See generally Meazell supra note 6 (exploring this approach of "scientific avoidance"
with respect to legislative science).
190. Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Massachusetts v. NRC, 924
F.2d 311, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[The Commission's licensing decisions are generally entitled to
the highest judicial deference because of the unusually broad authority that Congress delegated to
the agency under the Atomic Energy Act."); Ohio v. NRC, 868 F.2d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Con-
gress has recognized the highly technical nature of such regulations and has accordingly
circumscribed the power of the courts both to review and to overturn decisions made by the NRC.")
(citing Baltimore Gas's super-deference principle); Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400 F.2d 778,
783 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 creates "a regulatory scheme which is
virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the administrative agency,
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assimilate in nuclear power cases. Carstens v. NRC'9' provides a typical ex-
ample. There, the D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to the NRC's decision
to grant an operating license to a nuclear power plant in an area of seismic
activity in California. In considering whether to grant the license, the licens-
ing board conducted hearings that collected extensive evidence on the
seismic activity issue.192 As the court noted, the petitioners did not argue that
the NRC had failed to follow the required procedures in addressing the
seismic issue; "rather, they take issue with the substantive outcomes of those
investigations. Unfortunately for them, it is in these substantive areas that
this court's deference to the agency justifiably reaches its zenith."' 3
The court emphasized that the regulatory scheme at issue was "virtually
unique" in the broad discretion assigned to the NRC under the Atomic En-
ergy Act.194 Quoting Baltimore Gas, the court added that "the Supreme
Court has made it crystal clear that our review of NRC licensing decisions is
'limited.' "95 And "[t]he voluminous record persuasively evidences the care
with which the NRC discharged its statutory duties. Without hesitation, we
find that this decision is supported by substantial evidence, and that its ac-
tions were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." 96
Although the court's rhetoric was strong, it nevertheless addressed the
petitioners' specific contentions and described the agency's response. The
opinion further reveals that the petitioners' substantive arguments were di-
rected at proto- and mesopolicy decisions. For example, the parties
disagreed over the mesopolicy issue of how to interpret a U.S. Geological
Survey ("USGS") model of one of the fault zones. 1 The licensing board's
interpretation, however, was supported by record evidence: a USGS witness
testified at the hearing and explained its own interpretation, which the agen-
cy found persuasive.' 98 Indeed, the court, perhaps unnecessarily, stated,
"Petitioners' reading of the description set forth in the USGS model . . . is
entirely understandable, particularly in light of the fact that petitioners are
not and do not purport to be trained seismologists."'
free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objec-
tives"); cf Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding arbitrary
and capricious the NRC's unexplained change in decommissioning policy, which was contrary to
the agency's own regulations).
191. 742 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
192. Carstens, 742 F.2d at 1548-49.
193. Id. at 1550-51.
194. Id. at 1551.
195. Id. (quoting Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1555.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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As another example, the petitioners contended that the agency's deter-
mination that the reactors' design was adequate to protect public safety was
unsupported by substantial evidence.'" One witness had used a mean value
to arrive at the designed-for earthquake magnitude; the petitioners made the
protopolicy argument that he should have used the mean-value-plus-one
standard deviation.20' Yet the court determined that the NRC's reliance on
that witness was reasonable: the agency had explained the conservative as-
sumptions inherent in his model and his findings were corroborated by other
202testimony.
In sum, the petitioners' arguments seemed directed at policy: they ar-
gued that the scientific uncertainty associated with earthquakes coupled with
the statutory requirement that reactor design be based on conservative as-
sumptions, dictated that the court impose a different outcome.203 But as the
court explained, "[P]etitioners fundamentally misperceive the judiciary's
role in complex regulatory matters. The uncertainty of the science of earth-
quake prediction only serves to emphasize the limitations of judicial review
and the need for greater deference to policymaking entities."2 04
Because Carstens addressed each of the petitioners' contentions and de-
scribed why the NRC had nevertheless acted reasonably, it cannot be said
that the court mechanically applied super deference without exercising any
oversight.205 This is particularly true when one considers the proto- and me-
sopolicy nature of the petitioners' substantive arguments and the fact that
reasonable experts, exercising professional judgment, could disagree on
those matters. Even so, the court's strong language seemed to pit the might
of science against the petitioners' relative lack of expertise. Coupled with
the court's emphasis on the voluminous record, one can easily surmise that
this early post-Baltimore Gas exemplar reinforced agency incentives to
amass favorable science, stacking the deck for favorable future litigation and
contributing to ossification and the science charade.206
200. Id. at 1556.
201. Id. Standard deviation measures the dispersion of sample observations. GREENE, supra
note 61, at 1020. The mean-plus-one standard deviation would have produced a more precautionary
design assumption.
202. 742 F.2d at 1556.
203. See id. at 1557.
204. Id.
205. But see Siegel, supra note 12, at 366 (arguing Carstens demonstrates judicial willingness
to mechanically apply super deference, particularly in nuclear power decisions).
206. Numerous other nuclear power opinions, many coming closely on the heels of Baltimore
Gas, are similar to Carstens in their approaches and outcomes. E.g., Citizens for Fair Util. Regula-
tion v. NRC, 898 F.2d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Baltimore Gas for the general proposition of
deference and upholding the NRC's denial of a petition to intervene in a nuclear power plant licens-
ing proceeding); Envtl. Def. Fund v. NRC, 902 F.2d 785, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing the
Baltimore Gas super-deference principle in the Chevron context with respect to a regulation of ura-
nium and thorium mill tailings); Ohio v. NRC, 868 F.2d 810, 818-19 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding the
denial of a hearing to revoke a power plant's operating license because of challenges to its emer-
gency preparedness plan; the NRC did not act arbitrarily where it found that adequate measures
were in place should an emergency arise); Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a
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Although there may have been reasons to confine Baltimore Gas to its
unique nuclear-power context, the opinion itself is worded broadly, and
courts were quick to incorporate the super-deference principle in other con-
texts. The D.C. Circuit opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus provides an example.207 Ruckelshaus involved a challenge to
vehicle emissions testing requirements established by the EPA pursuant to
the Clean Air Act. In setting the standards, Congress mandated that the EPA
ensure that its "short test" requirements-protocols for testing emissions of
in-use vehicles-would correlate reasonably with tests used on preproduc-
tion vehicles. 208 The petitioners argued that the agency failed to comply with
its mandate that it use "good engineering practice[s]" because short-test re-
sults could not be correlated with preproduction tests due to differences
among temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure-a protopolicy
argument.2W The EPA explained, however, that the standards levels, or "cut-
points," it adopted, which utilized greatly simplified assumptions, were
designed to result in false positives no more frequently than in preproduc-
tion tests and made variations in ambient conditions insignificant.210
The court reasoned that the "use of cutpoints to fudge complex techno-
logical problems" was permissible so long as it was consistent with the
statutory scheme. 2' "In this respect," the court explained, "we are mindful
of the Supreme Court's recent admonition" in Baltimore Gas that requires
reviewing courts be at their most deferential when agencies act within their
expertise on the frontiers of science.212 Arguably, this factual scenario was
similar to Baltimore Gas: faced with the inability of science and technology
to fine-tune the agency's analysis, the agency made certain working assump-
tions that it acknowledged were imperfect. According to the court, those
assumptions were accorded deference because they reflected reasoned
challenge to the NRC's denial of a motion to intervene and reopen proceedings; would-be interve-
nors challenged the sufficiency of a nuclear power plant design in light of an earthquake that
occurred in the plant's vicinity, but, the possibility of an earthquake had been considered in the plant
design and the NRC did not act arbitrarily in refusing to reopen proceedings); Lorion v. NRC, 785
F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining the invitation to reverse the NRC's substantive decision
regarding the susceptibility of reactor vessels to pressurized thermal shock and explaining that the
issue falls squarely within Baltimore Gas); Aamodt v. NRC (In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc.), 771
F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding the decision to reopen a nuclear power plant following an acci-
dent); see also Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (acknowledging
distinctions, but illustrating that there is little practical difference between Baltimore Gas super
deference accorded to the agencies' interpretations of their own regulations and "the heightened
deference for NRC licensing decisions that flows from its broad statutory mandate").
207. 719 F2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
208. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d at 1161-62.
209. Id. at 1167. In other words, the preproduction tests took place in controlled laboratory
conditions, id. at 1161, whereas the short tests were conducted under real-world, ambient condi-
tions. The petitioners argued this difference was inconsistent with good engineering practices
because it made the tests impossible to correlate. Id. at 1167.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983)).
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judgment and incorporated policy choices-here, in accommodating the
conflicting interests of vehicle manufacturers and the public.213
Yet Ruckelshaus is notable for the cursory look it gave to the agency's
response to the ambient-conditions issue. Unlike Baltimore Gas, which ex-
plained the data relied on by the petitioners as well as how the agency
addressed those considerations, the Ruckelshaus opinion is silent as to the
potential impact of the petitioners' ambient conditions consideration, and it
does not describe why the agency's approach amounted to "good engineer-
ing practice." In fact, the opinion cites only the agency's ipse dixit to support
its determination that the agency acted reasonably.2 4 In these respects,
Ruckelshaus seemed to go further than Baltimore Gas itself. Not only did it
give deference to the agency's technical determinations, but it did not even
explain what those determinations were or why they were consistent with
the agency's statutory mandate." This approach seems unlikely to uncover
administrative science errors and it does little to reinforce transparency, de-
liberation, or accountability.
3. Transitions
While the super-deference principle continued to be cited in the coming
years, the extreme deference of the early post-Baltimore Gas period seemed
to give way to a more measured approach. An illustrative case is American
Legion v. Derwinski, in which the D.C. Circuit relied on the principle to up-
hold the Secretary of Veterans Affairs's ("VA") decision to abandon its study
of the long-term health effects of exposure to the chemical defoliant Agent
Orange.216 The unusual statutory scheme at issue, the Agent Orange Act of
213. See id. (describing agency's use of cutpoints as "a reasonable accommodation of the
conflicting interests").
214. Id.
215. Numerous other opinions, likewise involving little analysis, were issued shortly after
Baltimore Gas. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 264 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing
Baltimore Gas amongst list of deferential citations in support of upholding, following remand, the
EPA's best available technology determination pursuant to the CWA); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel,
839 F.2d 694, 761 & n. 107 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Baltimore Gas and upholding agency regulation
related to top soil storage pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, where the
agency made a reasoned decision relevant to "highly technical issue"); Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1430 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Here we deal with issues not of fact or law but of
scientific measurement. In assessing difficult issues of scientific method and laboratory procedure,
we must defer to a great extent to the expertise of the EPA." (citing Baltimore Gas)); New York v.
EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing super deference to support upholding the agen-
cy's interpretations of scientific evidence underpinning the denial of state petitions to reevaluate
CAA implementation plants); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing the
super-deference principle and upholding the EPA's disapproval of the state's proposed rules to con-
trol fugitive dust emissions); Hawaiian Electric Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citing the super-deference principle to support upholding the agency's reliance on its modeling
techniques for Clean Air Act permitting). But see Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (relying not on super deference but on Baltimore Gas's more general language
describing the role of NEPA in ensuring that an agency has taken a "hard look" at environmental
consequences to uphold injunction on experiment using release of genetically altered bacteria).
216. 54 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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1991,217 involved a congressionally mandated study to investigate these ef-
fects in Vietnam veterans.218 Numerous agencies were involved, including
the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, and a presidential oversight panel. The court began by meticulously
describing various failed attempts at designing a study, after which the VA
issued a letter to Congress that stated:
[N]o one has successfully identified a large enough group of Vietnam vet-
erans known to have been exposed to Agent Orange or other herbicides to
allow the preparation of a protocol and the conduct of an epidemiological
study as required by [the statute]. I must, therefore, advise you that no sci-
entifically sound study can be undertaken and request that the VA be
relieved of the requirement to do this research.29
The American Legion challenged this determination, arguing it was arbi-
trary and capricious. In its recitation of the standards applicable to the
challenge of this determination, the court began with typical State Farm and
Overton Park language, emphasizing that it would examine challenges to the
agency's scientific conclusions, but would afford those conclusions super def-
220
erence.
Among other things, the plaintiffs challenged the merit of the CDC's
methodology in concluding that exposure estimates based on military re-
cords were not scientifically valid.221 The court rejected this protopolicy
challenge, emphasizing that the secretary had acted reasonably in the face of
scientific impossibility.222 Relatedly, the plaintiffs challenged the VA's deci-
sion to cancel the Agent Orange study. The court likewise rejected this
argument, listing the various sources of evidence upon which the VA had
relied, and concluding that the VA's conclusion that no scientifically valid
223
study could be performed was reasoned.
American Legion represents a transitional super-deference approach for
two reasons. First, it is notable that the court included the super-deference
citation in the same recitation of standards that included the hard-look State
Farm citation. This usage hints that super deference was becoming boiler-
plate-a suggestion confirmed by later cases.224 Second, although lacking in
detailed analysis, the opinion presented a sufficiently full discussion of the
217. Pub. L. No. 102-4, § 2(a)(1), 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified as amended at 38 U.S. § 1116
(2006)).
218. Am. Legion v. Derwinski, 827 E Supp. 805, 807 (D.D.C. 1993), aff'd, 54 F.3d 789 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
219. 54 E3d at 794.
220. Id. at 795.
221. Id. at 799.
222. Id. at 801. On this same point, the district court had opined, "At the heart of plaintiffs'
arguments, however, is a challenge to the scientific merit of the CDC's research rather than the
rationality of its conclusion. . .. [Tihe Court finds that the CDC's methodology and research exhibit
reasoned decisionmaking .. .. " 827 E Supp. at 813.
223. 54 F.3d at 801.
224. See infra Section II.C.4 (providing examples of this development).
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facts to provide support for its later conclusion that the agency engaged in
reasoned decision making. As discussed below, later cases reveal an increas-
ingly less super-deferential approach, wherein courts carefully discuss the
scientific issues raised. American Legion therefore exemplifies an interme-
diate step between cases like Ruckelshaus and what was to come.225
4. Modern Applications: Super Deference as Boilerplate
and the Return to Hard Look
Recent applications of super deference support these conclusions. First,
the principle has become meaningless boilerplate. It is typically cited by
courts along with the hard-look standards set forth in State Farm, and it is
226
rarely used separately to illuminate courts' analyses.26 Second, the courts
have moved away from the extreme deference exhibited by cases like Car-
stens and Ruckelshaus, returning to a hard-look approach that systematically
describes and evaluates each major scientific contention.2
21Consider American Coke & Coal Chemicals Institute v. EPA, in which
the D.C. Circuit upheld an EPA rule that revised nationwide limitations on
certain water pollutant discharges associated with coke making.2 The chal-
lenge focused primarily on assumptions the EPA made in setting industry
effluent limitations. For example, to compensate for data gaps relevant to the
ability of publicly owned treatment works ("POTW") to remove coke-making
pollutants, the EPA made two estimates. First, where POTWs provided data
on the minimum detected levels of the pollutants in effluent, the EPA assumed
that influent contained ten times those minimum levels.230 Second, where the
pollutants were below detectable levels, the EPA assumed that influent con-
231tained the minimum detectable levels. In its explanation of these selections,
225. For opinions illustrating similar approaches, see, for example, Associated Fisheries of
Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (brief analysis following description of facts;
upholding agency action under Magnuson Act); Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing Baltimore Gas along with State Farm, but providing more discussion of evidence supporting
petitioner's and the FDA's positions with respect to labeling of oral contraceptives); and compare
Harris v. United States, 19 F.3d 1090, 1096 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing the scientific evidence
for both sides but upholding FWS delineation of wetlands).
226. An occasional early case took this approach. See, e.g., New Mexico v. HUD, No. 84-
2347, 1987 WL 109007, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Jan. 7, 1987) (unpublished opinion) (citing both State
Farm and Baltimore Gas super deference and upholding safety standards for formaldehyde levels in
manufactured housing).
227. These observations belie one Baltimore Gas observer's early prediction that State Farm
ought to be viewed as a specialized exception to Baltimore Gas: "In review of administrative environ-
mental determinations, the Baltimore Gas standard clearly dominates." Siegel, supra note 12, at 375.
228. 452 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
229. As the court explained, coke is "cooked" coal. Am. Coke & Coal Chems., 452 F.3d at 933
n.2. The court defined the various pollutants at issue, which included naphthalene, a primary ingre-
dient in mothballs. Id. at 933 n.4.
230. Id. at 935.
231. Id.
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the EPA acknowledged that these choices might lead to both over- and under-
estimations of the actual influent levels.232
Citing both State Farm and the super-deference principle, the court re-
jected the protopolitical challenges to this methodology.2 3  As the court
explained, the "EPA was confronted with a situation in which it was not
possible, given the current state of technology, to establish conclusively the
relative effectiveness" of types of treatment. The petitioner had cited noth-
ing suggesting the EPA's assumptions were unreasonable; thus, the court
upheld the EPA's approach, emphasizing that "[s]uch decisions involve ex-
pert statistical and scientific judgments to which this court properly
defers."235 Still, even though the court could have easily rejected the peti-
tioner's challenge for failing to provide competing evidence, the court took
each contention in turn, explaining the issues and evidence supporting the
236
reasonableness of the agency's determination.
Likewise, in Catawba County v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit considered chal-
lenges to the EPA's 2004 designations for the national ambient air quality
standards ("NAAQS") applicable to fine particulate matter pursuant to the
Clean Air Act.237 After rejecting challenges that the EPA improperly failed to
use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and failed to properly in-
terpret its statutory mandate pursuant to Chevron, the court turned to the
argument that the designations rule was arbitrary and capricious because it
was "riddled with methodological flaws and inconsistencies." 238 The court
cited the general standard for arbitrary and capriciousness, and stated, "Of
particular note in this challenge, we give an extreme degree of deference to
[the EPA] when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical exper-
tise."239
Thereafter, the court turned to each of the challengers' many arguments.
For example, the challengers contended that the EPA had "relied upon a
mistaken estimate of carbon emissions by power plants that burn bituminous
coal."240 It turned out that the EPA was wrong about those estimates, and it
232. Id. at 935 & n.10.
233. See id. at 941-42 ("The court owes particular deference to EPA when its rulemakings
rest upon matters of scientific and statistical judgment within the agency's sphere of special compe-
tence and statutory jurisdiction.").
234. Id. at 942-43.
235. Id. at 943.
236. Id. at 943-48.
237. 571 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the popular media, "fine particular matter" is often
called "soot." See, e.g., Jane Kay, EPA Ignores Advice for Annual Limits on Tiny Soot: Science Panel
Had Urged Tighter Rules, Citing Health Effects, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, at A3. As the court
explained, the size of the particulate matter being regulated was 2.5 micrometers or smaller, "less
than one-thirtieth the thickness of a human hair." Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 26.
238. 571 F.3d at 40. Note that the court applies the same standard of review for arbitrary and
capriciousness under the Clean Air Act as under the APA. Id. at 41.
239. Id. at 41 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 44. The term "bituminous" refers to a classification reflecting the amount of carbon
in coal. See Coal Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/
revised its carbon emission profile for those plants in 2006.241 But the 2004
designations were based on the old estimates; thus, the industry petitioners
argued that the nonattainment designations for power plants burning bitumi-
nous coal were flawed. The EPA responded that "its ultimate designations
did not turn on any one estimate of a single chemical component of [fine
particulate matter]."m2 "Rather, [it] relied on numerous data points .. . that
were largely unaffected by the lower carbon estimate." A Further, the EPA
explained that as the carbon estimate decreased, the crustal estimate actually
increased, so the overall determination was not substantially impacted.2
At this juncture, the court reasoned that the EPA was not required to up-
end its entire process when it discovered its mistake; all that was required
was for the agency to use the best information available when making its
decisions, and to deal with newly acquired evidence " 'in some reasonable
fashion.' "' Here, the court explained, the EPA dealt reasonably with the
new evidence because it explained why it would not have changed the des-
ignations. In fact, the EPA even granted a March 2006 request to recalculate
the weighted emissions scores using the revised emissions estimates and
concluded that doing so would not change the outcome.2
Notably, the court did not mention the super-deference principle in any
of its analysis of the arbitrary-and-capricious review of the agency's actions.
It did mention State Farm once,247 for upholding a decision of "less than
ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned," 248 and it later
referenced the same case for the concept of deferential review, where an
agency must articulate a "rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made."249 The closest the court came to super-deference language
was in its unremarkable discussion of the remedy: "In light of the agency's
scientific expertise and the complexity of the designation process, we re-
mand to give EPA another opportunity to provide a coherent explanation for
its designation."250
Courts have likewise cited the super-deference principle when reviewing
adjudications. Hayward v. United States Department of Labor involved an
energyexplainedlindex.cfm?page=coal-home (last updated Jan. 26, 2010). Bituminous coal is the
most abundant type of coal in the United States. Id.
241. 571 F.3d at 45.
242. Id.
243. Id
244. Id.
245. Id. (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
246. Id. at 45-46. Although the court upheld the rulemaking generally, it did remand the
designation applied to a single New York county because that county was designated as a nonat-
tainment area, even though similarly situated counties in a different region were designated
attainment areas. Id. at 51.
247. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
248. 571 F.3d at 50 (quoting 463 U.S. at 43).
249. Id. at 52 (quoting 463 U.S. at 43).
250. Id.
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adjudication for survivor benefits under the Energy Occupational Illness
Compensation Program Act, which provides benefits to employees with ill-
nesses caused by exposure to radiation while working for the Department of
Energy.25 The specific provision at issue allowed employees' eligible survi-
vors to receive a lump-sum payment for cancer caused by exposure to
radiation; however, entitlement required the cancer to have been "at least as
likely as not related to employment."25 2 When an individual seeks such a
payment, the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs uses a specified
computer software program to make a probability-of-causation calcula-
tion.253 While the program's default settings account for uncertainty from
several sources, the model allows the user to adjust those default settings to
account for additional uncertainty.254 According to the program's manual,
adjustments should be made only for sufficient justifications accompanied
by written rationales.255
The petitioner, a widow, contested the agency's denial of benefits. The
agency had determined that there was just over a 21 percent likelihood that
the deceased's cancer was caused by radiation exposure. 256 At a hearing be-
fore the agency, the widow raised the protopolitical contentions that the
model should have been adjusted to account for the rarity of her husband's
cancer and for its allegedly higher correlation with radiation exposure.257
The Department of Labor consulted with a physicist as well as a representa-
tive of the program's developer, and determined that the default settings
should not have been adjusted.25
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment
to the agency, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard. 259 After recit-
ing the usual State Farm and Overton Park formulations of the standard, the
court also noted that, for technical decisions like this one, "[w]e must look
at the decision not as a chemist, biologist, or statistician that we are quali-
fied neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court
exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal
standards of rationality."260 Applying these principles, the court reasoned that
251. 536 F.3d 376, 377 (5th Cir. 2008).
252. Hayward, 536 F.3d at 377 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7384n(b) (2006)).
253. Id. at 378. The program uses dose-response data from the Japanese atomic-bomb-
survivor cohort, coupled with an employee-specific dose reconstruction. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 379.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See id. (describing the procedural background and standard of review).
260. Id. at 380 (quoting Gulf Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 452 F.3d 362, 368
(5th Cir. 2006)). This statement is traceable to the 1983 decision Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), which borrowed language from Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d
1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). Interestingly, Ethyl Corp. is frequently cited as an example of the
trend of examining agencies' records in great detail. E.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise:
Michigan Law Review
the agency had specifically addressed both the widow's contentions and had
reasonably explained its decision.16 The model already accounted for rare
cancers in one of its formulae, and any adjustment would have over-
262
represented the rare cancers. As for the decedent's cancer being more ra-
diogenic than others, the agency rejected the widow's proffered study
because it involved development of the rare cancer in patients already
263
undergoing radiation treatment for existing cancer.
American Coke, Catawba County, and Hayward illustrate the conver-
gence of the super-deference cases and "ordinary" hard-look cases. In each,
the court described the science at issue, the particular contentions of the
parties, and the basis in the record for concluding the agency engaged in
reasoned decision making. This substantive approach, combined with the
recitations of super deference in boilerplate along with State Farm, illus-
trates the lack of any real meaning remaining for the super-deference
standard. The numerous other recent opinions citing Baltimore Gas for su-
265per deference illustrate these same tendencies.
One final case warrants discussion because it suggests a possible endur-
ing role for super deference. In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v.
United States,266 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice's biological opinion on a Corps of Engineers plan to restrict water
Administrative Lw and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1160 n. 112
(2001); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the Continuing
Relevance of the Process/Substance, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 997 (2006) (citing Ethyl Corp. as
example of process/substance debate).
261. 536 F.3d at 381.
262. Id. at 381. The court explained the agency's reasoning both with technical terminology,
and "in other words," using an alternative, perhaps more accessible, explanation. Id.
263. Id. at 381-82.
264. For but one example of an ordinary hard-look case doing the same thing, see Kennecott
Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 476 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (uphold-
ing mine safety standards for exposure to diesel particulate matter).
265. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 192 (4th Cir.
2009) (citing both State Farm and Baltimore Gas and upholding issuance of Clean Water Act per-
mits); id. at 201, 205 (using Baltimore Gas in analysis); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Russell, 518 F.3d 817,
823-24 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Marsh's Baltimore Gas quotation of super deference along with
State Farm factors, describing the evidence, and upholding the forest management plan); Citizens
Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F3d 879, 890 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing State Farm and Baltimore
Gas super deference in recitation of standards and upholding the EPA's Clean Water Act effluent
limitations for coal-mining activities with thorough analysis); Am. Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs (In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig.), 421 F.3d 618, 628 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing State
Farm and Marsh in recitation of standards, discussing each contention, and upholding federal man-
agement of Missouri River); Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing both
State Farm and Baltimore Gas in analysis and upholding the EPA's approval of state implementation
plan under the Clean Air Act); cf Tuscon Herpetological Soc'y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 878-80
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing State Farm, comparing Baltimore Gas, and discussing in detail and holding
arbitrary and capricious the agency's reliance on "ambiguous" evidence regarding lizard population
to withdraw proposed threatened listing). Even recent nuclear-related opinions are consistent with
this trend. See, e.g., Morris v. NRC, 598 F.3d 677 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding agency's approval of
uranium mining).
266. 566 F.3d 1257 (1Ith Cir. 2009).
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flowing to a portion of the Everglades. The plan was meant to benefit the
endangered cape sable sea sparrow, but would have negative impacts on an-
other endangered species, the everglades snail kite.26 Among the contentions
of the tribe challenging the opinion was that it was arbitrary and capricious
because it arrived at conclusions counter to scientific data in the record and so
269implausible as to go beyond a difference in expert opinion.
The court's analysis suggests a possible use for the super-deference
principle as a balance-tipper. In outlining the applicable standards, the court
began by quoting both State Farm and the Baltimore Gas super-deference
principle.270 The biological opinion had concluded that the kite would not be
jeopardized if the plan's implementation continued into the early 2010s. But
the opinion conceded that the plan would harm about 20 percent of the
kite's habitat.17' Further, the plan anticipated water-level-related threats to
kite nests, reduced foraging habitat, and reduced abundance of the kite's
primary prey.272 The court seemed skeptical; the agency argued that no per-
manent loss was expected, but cited no authority for the proposition that
negative impact on a species' habitat must be permanent to amount to ad-
273
verse modification.
Despite the court's skepticism, it upheld the agency's action. The agency
reached its conclusion not solely on the duration of habitat loss, but took
into account the species' life cycle and behavior.274 Then the court stated:
"[W]e do owe a high level of deference to the Service's scientific determina-
tions. The deference owed the 2006 biological opinion is especially strong
because the agency had to predict future hydrologic conditions and estimate
the likelihood, extent, and duration of injury to a species."" Even so, the
court carefully underscored the factual context of the case: the opinion was
part of a long-term program to eventually restore the Everglades and hope-
fully benefit both birds; and the temporary flooding was done in an effort to
276
avoid the extinction of another endangered species. In light of this back-
ground, the court ruled that the agency's determination of no adverse impact
was not arbitrary and capricious, but confined the opinion to its facts.
267. The court used colorful language in its description of the history of the "river of grass,"
whose water people had attempted to "bend" and "tame." Miccosukee Tribe, 566 F.3d at 1261.
268. Id. at 1262-64. As the court noted, the dispute "pit[ted] a sparrow against a hawk." Id. at
1262.
269. Id. at 1265.
270. Id. at 1264.
271. Id. at 1269.
272. Id. at 1269-70.
273. Id. at 1270 ("Evidently the Service is under the impression that flooding twenty percent
of the kites' critical habitat to a depth that kills the woody vegetation the bird likes to perch on, that
drives off the apple snails it likes to eat, and that reduces its nesting success is not 'adverse modifi-
cation' of critical habitat within the meaning of the Act.").
274. Id. at 1271.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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Miccosukee suggests a vestigial use for the super-deference principle.
Although the court evinced doubt about the actual ability of the plan to pre-
vent harm to the kite population, it used super deference as a balance-tipper.
Without needing to separate science from policy, the court mentioned that
deference should be "especially strong" because the agency had predicted
future hydrologic conditions and estimated the likelihood, extent, and dura-
tion of injury to the kite."' Those scientific determinations were of course
uncertain; they were proto- and mesopolitical predictions.
Although super deference might be viewed as a balance-tipper, the prin-
ciple has come a long way since Baltimore Gas. Even in Miccosukee, it is
cited along with the classic hard-look State Farm standard in a way that
suggests it has lost its original meaning.278 Probing further, the analysis the
courts apply seems more detailed, and less superficial, than initial cases like
Carstens, and especially Ruckelshaus. Given the historical, contextual, and
practical problems associated with super deference, one can hardly mourn
the principle's fall into disuse. But its demise leaves a question both unar-
ticulated, and unanswered: what ought to be the role of courts in reviewing
agency science?
III. COURTS AS TRANSLATORS
Taking the super-deference cases together as a whole, a different picture
of the courts' role with respect to science emerges. What the American Coke,
Catawba County, Hayward, and Miccosukee courts are doing is conveying
vital information about the agency science at issue. They are explaining the
science, the uncertainties, and the differing arguments: they are translating the
highly technical and scientific information in agency records for public con-
sumption. This observation suggests a normative role for the generalist courts
whereby they convey specialized information, enhancing opportunities for
participation and encouraging transparency, deliberation, and accountability.
Scholarship investigating the functions of written judicial opinions fo-
cuses on the ability of written opinions to impose a disciplined decision-
making process, facilitate the precedent system, and legitimate the judicial
decisions.279 I contend, however, that judicial opinions reviewing agency
science can serve an additional function in providing generalist accounts of
specialized information for largely nonscientific consumers. Indeed, what
we ought to expect from the reasoned decision-making requirement is for
277. Id.
278. Courts persist in this approach. See, e.g., AES Sparrows Point LNG, L.L.C. v. Wilson,
589 F.3d 721, 733 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing the super-deference standard as boilerplate and upholding
the denial of Clean Water Act permit on substantive grounds); Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (citing Baltimore Gas's super-deference
principle as well as State Farm in recitation of standards, with no mention in the actual analysis); cf
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 693 E Supp. 2d 1145, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Baltimore Gas in standards section in conjunction with best science standard for biological opinions).
279. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Func-
tion, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1317 (2008).
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courts to be able to explain the science and the uncertainties, and acknowl-
edge the policy considerations when engaging in review. If a generalist
judge is able to do this for a lay audience, it furthers the participatory goals
inherent in the constitutional design and it enhances the opportunities for
oversight of agency science.
As demonstrated most prominently-but by no means exclusively-by
the "good science" movement discussed above, many observers of the
courts would like courts' roles to involve "fixing" bad science. The great
practical difficulty with all of these cases that involve proto- and mesopolicy
challenges, however, is that it is nearly impossible to assess how "right"
their facts are with respect to science. Barring any obvious scientific or po-
litical misconduct, it is perfectly legitimate to think that reasonable
scientists, exercising their best professional judgment, would disagree with
some of the outcomes, whether in the agencies or the courts. Moreover, the
various areas of scientific uncertainty are so specialized that it would require
a broad array of specialists to truly assess that "rightness"-something ju-
rists are not trained to do. And of course, scientific "rightness" is a relative
and moving target. But perhaps these observations make the point: if rea-
sonable scientists would disagree, and agencies adopt metapolicy choices in
keeping with the then-governing administration, courts ought not further
their own policy-driven goals by policing agencies too tightly. Nevertheless,
they stand to fulfill a very important function in their translations by bring-
ing clarity to complex issues of agency science.
Indeed, the processes necessary for translation and technical communica-
tion suggest analogous processes for courts reviewing agency science. A
translator, for example, must engage the source text to produce an altogether
new product: the text in the target language.28 Likewise, a technical commu-
nicator must develop a command of the relevant science sufficient to convey
that information to a nonscientific audience."' So too does hard-look review
afford the opportunity for courts to develop the literacy necessary to trans-
late scientific issues into understandable prose for consumers of legal
opinions.
280. See JEREMY MUNDAY, INTRODUCING TRANSLATION STUDIES 63 (2d ed. 2008) (setting
forth cognitive process of translation, including reading and understanding the source text, deverbal-
izing, and reexpressing the sense of the source text in the target language).
281. A traditional theoretical perspective views this process as akin to interpretation. See
Gregory Clark, Ethics in Technical Communication: A Rhetorical Perspective, 30 IEEE TRANSAC-
TIONS ON PROF. COMM. 190, 191 (1987) ("[TJhis perspective describes a person who communicates
technical information functioning as an interpreter . . . ."). Further, the translation hypothesis opens
the way for judicial opinions to be considered in light of their ethical implications. See Gregory
Clark, Ethics in Technical Communication: A Rhetorical Perspective, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
PROF. COMM. 190 (1987) (describing various models of ethics in technical communication and sug-
gesting a collaborative perspective aided by research in rhetoric).
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In addition, the necessity of understanding one's audience28 casts the
generalist background of judges as a strength because consumers of judicial
opinions are often generalists themselves. Note that the language in opinions
like American Coke, Catawba County, Hayward, and Miccosukee reveals
devices that both illustrate the courts' comprehension and serve to enhance
the readers' understanding. For example, these opinions use analogies,23
284 255286
metaphors,284 plain-language definitions,285 and restatements of key ideas
that make the complex science at issue more accessible.287
Conceptualizing the courts as translators helps align the democracy-
forcing normative goals of judicial review with observations from other dis-
ciplines about the role of science rhetoric in the development of policy.28 As
Dr. Waddell has argued, science-based rhetoric has the capacity to "educate
a democratic audience," thereby maximizing the powers of the citizenry to
282. A classic account may be found in KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1969) (1962). See, e.g., id. at 55 ("You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his.");
see also Clark, supra note 281, at 194 (arguing technical communication ought to be judged by its
ability to facilitate a common understanding between communicators and their audiences, "includ-
ing an understanding of problems, conclusions, consequences, and implications").
283. E.g., Catawba County v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing the size of
particulate matter at issue as 1/30th the thickness of human hair). This same analogy appeared in the
final rule being challenged under the heading, "What are Fine Particles?" See Designations of Areas
for Air Quality Planning Purposes, 40 C.F.R. § 81 (2009). Following the issuance of the court's
opinion, the Bloomberg News Service also borrowed the human-hair analogy. Cary O'Reilly, EPA
Air-Pollution Rules on Soot Upheld on Appeal (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ai7oYjEiOcuk.
284. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009), is
full of metaphors. E.g., id. at 1261 (describing the Everglades as a "river of grass," and speaking of
"tam[ing] the Everglades" and "bend[ing] the water"); id. at 1265 (noting the party's arguments "do
not hold water").
285. E.g., Am. Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d 930, 933 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(defining coke as "cooked" coal); id. at 933 n.4 (defining pollutants at issue and including everyday
example that naphthalene is the primary ingredient in mothballs).
286. E.g., Miccosukee Tribe, 566 F.3d at 1270; Hayward v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 536 F.3d 376,
381 (5th Cir. 2008).
287. These have long been recognized both as helpful tools in communicating scientific and
technical information and as inescapable components of scientific rhetoric. See, e.g., MICHAEL
ALLEY, THE CRAFT OF SCIENTIFIC WRITING 115 (3d ed., Springer 1996) ("Two of the best tools for
explaining unfamiliar concepts are examples and analogies."); S. Michael Halloran & Annette Nor-
ris Bradford, Figures of Speech in the Rhetoric of Science and Technology, in ESSAYS ON CLASSICAL
RHETORIC AND MODERN DISCOURSE 179, 183-88 (Robert J. Connors et al. eds., 1984) (providing
examples demonstrating the communicative strength of figures of speech); Larry D. Yore et al.,
Written Discourse in Scientific Communities: A conversation with two scientists about their views of
science, use of language, role of writing in doing science, and compatibility between their epistemic
views and language, 28 INT'L J. OF Sci. EDUC. 109, 138 (2006) ("[Alnalogies and metaphors play
an important role in communicating science.").
288. That is, scientists must increasingly present and interpret complex technical information
for the benefit of nonscientific policymakers. Craig Waddell, The Role of Pathos in the Decision-
Making Process: A Study of the Rhetoric of Science Policy, in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON RHETORIC OF
SCIENCE 127, 127-28 (Randy Allen Harris ed., 1997). This process falls within the traditional realm
of rhetoric. Id.
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engage in the democratic process.29 Waddell's research focuses on the
rhetoric of scientists themselves, but judicial opinions similarly stand to
provide accessible information about the relevant science to a generalist
audience, enabling informed participation.
Consider the various scenarios that might arise. First, suppose an agency
does everything "right" with respect to science, yet the court fundamentally
misunderstands the science at issue and as a result, holds the action arbitrary
and capricious. The typical remedy is a remand, whereupon the agency
would have the opportunity to correct the misunderstanding and perhaps
better explain itself the second time. At the same time, the court's opinion-
reflecting its own understanding that developed as it engaged in hard-look
review-ought to reveal judicial scientific misconceptions. As has been
noted elsewhere, there is an army of judicial watchdogs looking for such
290judicial errors. Judicial opinions translating science for a lay audience
ought to make the watchdog task less burdensome because those groups
could more easily identify any errors and bring those to the agency's atten-
tion on remand.
Second, suppose the agency and the court both make fundamental errors
of science, resulting in a court's upholding an agency action. At this point,
the hard-look translation is even more important because it makes those er-
rors understandable to a broad audience. More accessible to the public and
Congress than an administrative record, the translation affords the opportu-
nity for such consumers to be alerted to the problem, bringing political
pressure or corrective statutes to bear on the agency.
More importantly, even if the agency and court both get science "right,"
an opinion that sufficiently explains the science and policy at issue provides
valuable information highlighting the proto-, meso-, and metapolitical as-
pects of the case.291 Take, for example, the American Legion case discussed
above. As detailed in the court's opinion, there were a number of reasons
that the agencies involved concluded it would be impossible to design a
study of the impacts of exposure in Vietnam veterans. Prior to the case, the
House Committee on Government Operations issued a report to Congress
entitled "The Agent Orange Coverup: A Case of Flawed Science and Politi-
cal Manipulation."292 The report generally accuses the agencies involved of
289. Id. at 145. Likewise, there is some evidence that nonscientist members of the public draw
on science for their arguments during notice-and-comment rulemaking. See generally Danielle
Endres, Science and Public Participation: An Analysis of Public Scientific Argument in the Yucca
Mountain Controversy, 3 ENVTL. Comm. 49 (2009).
290. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 181, 199 (describing "scholarly attention to specific deficiencies in environmental laws and the
rash of attacks on junk science").
291. There is a role for detailed dissents here, too. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Ara-
coma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2009) (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) (concluding agency acted arbitrarily); Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 915-23
(6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing, in detail, why agency's actions were
arbitrary and capricious).
292. H.R. REP. No. 101-672 (1990). It is difficult to overstate the highly charged political
nature of this issue.
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using flawed science, and the Reagan Administration of controlling and ob-
293
structing the study. Although the truth of these assertions was probably not
resolved by the Agent Orange litigation, that truth is somewhat immaterial
294because Congress, aware of the Agent Orange case, continued to compen-
sate exposed veterans even though the science was uncertain. For example,
the Veteran's Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 provides that "[a]
Vietnam-era herbicide-exposed veteran is eligible ... for hospital care,
medical services, and nursing home care ... for any disability, notwith-
standing that there is insufficient medical evidence to conclude that such
disability may be associated with exposure."295
The story of Agent Orange suggests a possible objection to my hypothe-
sis. It is certainly costly to correct agency action after it has become final
and been litigated.296 Although costlier to respond to agency science after,
rather than before, agency action, we should want our judicial opinions to be
as accessible as possible, particularly when scientific and technical issues
are involved. And even if it is preferable to address problems in agencies in
the first instance, the very design of our system contemplates an ongoing
dialog between the branches.
Several other possible objections are worth considering. First, we know
that translation carries the risk that the translator will subtract from, add to,
or fundamentally alter the meaning set forth in the source text.m In translat-
ing agency science, courts ought to avoid making such changes, and the
parties ought to be alert to instances where this may possibly occur. But are
we asking too much of courts in this respect? It may be argued that courts
are simply not up to the task; they are not suited to reviewing science, let
alone communicating it.
Although courts are not scientists themselves, they are well-versed in the
broader process of understanding the facts presented and the logical links
293. Id., pt. 1, at 1-3. [Executive Summary].
294. See, e.g., American Legion Legislative Presentation: Joint Hearing on Legislative Priori-
ties of the American Legion Before the H. and S. Veterans Affairs Comms., 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Daniel Ludwig, National Commander, American Legion) (referencing petition for
certiorari to Supreme Court in American Legion).
295. 38 U.S.C. § 1710(e)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
296. When the legislature directly monitors agency action, this approach is known as "police-
patrol oversight." Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms
and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. EcoN & ORG. 96, 97 (1994) ("By definition, police-patrol
oversight is likely to be an effective way for legislators to track bureaucratic actions. However, it is
also likely to be very costly in terms of the time and resources needed to conduct it."); see also
Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV.
1243, 1303 (1999) (noting high transaction costs).
297. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION 235 (1990) (crediting Ortega y Gas-
set for describing these modifications as "deficiencies" and "exuberances," respectively). Professor
White's work suggests that judges act as translators of legal texts, such as the Constitution, and in so
doing, ought to apply meaning in light of modem issues and culture. See id. at 269. For reviews of
this work, see Susan Sage Heinzelman, Another Version of "Sweetness and Light": White on Cul-
tural and Legal Criticism, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 259 (1992) (book review); Sanford Levinson,
Conversing About Justice, 100 YALE L.J. 1855 (1991) (book review); Kenneth L. Karst, The Inter-
preters, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1655 (1990) (book review); Mark V. Tushnet, Translation as Argument,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 105 (1990) (book review).
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between those facts and the relevant legal standards. That sort of analysis
transcends subject matter. And one of the problems in Baltimore Gas was
treating science as though it was somehow special or different. Asking
courts to act as translators simply asks them to examine the administrative
record with the same analytical mindset courts ought to bring to any com-
plex issue, and then convey their analysis to others.
Still, courts' struggles with scientific concepts have been well docu-
mented in other contexts. Much of the Daubert literature, for example,
emphasizes the mistakes of science that courts make in applying that stan-
dard.2 98 Part of the problem with Daubert is that it requires courts to
artificially channel science into a reliability matrix that has more to do with
the exigencies of litigation than the norms of science. Unlike the Daubert
context, courts reviewing agency science are not required to delve deeply
into the relevant scientific norms, but rather to assess what an agency has
done for reasonableness. Admitting that mistakes of science may happen
even in the agency-science context, however, I hope that the translation ap-
proach can at least provide transparency in judicial reasoning. Again, if
courts are good science communicators, it ought to be easier to assess where
they have gone astray with respect to science.
Second, rhetoricians of science have recognized the possibility that logic
can wholly supplant ethics; put in legal terminology, an opinion focusing
only on science would obscure the policy considerations relevant to the
agency's action.29 Relatedly, a criticism of hard-look review involves the
possibility that courts will impose their own policy views on agencies in the
guise of searching scrutinyY? Admittedly, my argument for the translation
approach assumes that the costs of super deference are higher than those of
hard-look review, and indeed, I have not purported to respond to the many
criticisms of hard-look in this Article. I believe, however, that these objec-
tions do not suggest any new vulnerabilities, but rather represent new ways
to understand what might be going on in judicial opinions. So conceived, we
can consider these not as objections, but as part of the normative framework
that can enlighten our assessments of the strength of such opinions.
298. See Cranor, supra note 8; Meazell, supra note 6, at 253 & n.72 (collecting criticisms).
Scholars of administrative law have raised similar objections. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text.
299. For an extreme example, see Steven B. Katz, The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rheto-
ric, Technology, and the Holocaust, 54 C. ENG. 255 (1992), which discusses the ability of the Nazi
regime to mask Holocaust atrocities with seemingly benign or highly technical rhetoric.
300. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 24, at 765 ("[Clritics charge that hard look review may
give judges an excuse to strike down policies they dislike on substantive grounds."). The judicial
ideology literature further suggests that "the ideological preferences of judges and Justices have
considerable explanatory power in the context of judicial review of agency actions." Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review ofAgency Actions Mean?, 9 (George Washington
Univ. L. Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 505, 2010), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1604701. If this is so, perhaps one answer is that ideology is
a complication that impacts judicial review regardless of where one lies on the hard-look-super-
deference spectrum.
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Finally, I am mindful that if a court is to provide a strong generalist
translation, it must rely on the litigating parties for help. But if agencies are
expecting a hard look, they will be incentivized to use normal language and
accessible explanations, and challengers of agency action ought to do the
same. Consider also the alternative: if super deference is applied as it was in
cases like Carstens and Ruckelshaus, administrative-law values and science
suffer. Those cases incentivize impenetrable records by the agencies and
shallow review by the courts. By viewing the courts as important generalist
conveyors of information, we can assess their opinions as generalists and act
on the information provided. This approach not only helps the lay audience
understand the science-policy continuum, but it reinforces the notions of
transparency, deliberation, and accountability that legitimize administrative
lawmaking.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered both a new description and a normative account
of the relationship between courts and agencies with respect to science. The
traditional view, encompassed in super deference, is that generalist courts
ought to be at their most deferential when expert agencies regulate at the
frontiers of science. But this position fails to consider that agency science is
a policy-infused construct, and it disincentivizes transparency with respect
to such policy. It further rewards agencies for amassing impenetrable re-
cords, undermining the participatory and deliberative goals of administrative
law. In addition, such a superficial judicial review of agency science risks
compounding scientific errors, doing little to legitimize the administrative
process.
A comprehensive assessment of super deference lays bare these weak-
nesses, but it also does something more. This Article hypothesizes that
generalist courts act as translators, providing a bridge between the technical
generators of agency science and the lay consumers of it. This account sees
the courts' generalist perspective as an asset, because it enables the courts to
provide accessible descriptions of even the most technical agency science.
In turn, courts reinforce administrative-law values by educating Congress,
judicial watchdogs, and the public about science in the regulatory state.
784 [Vol. 109:733
